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ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates the interaction between freedom and limitation as applied to political 
expression and hate speech. The need for the limitation of hate speech, with its inherent risk of 
escalation into other serious crimes such as genocide, is established. The view of the South 
African courts is identified as pro-limitation but generally respectful of the right to freedom of 
expression. A lacuna in current constitutional law, common law and legislative remedies is 
evident and the various ways in which limitation can be effected are explored; the researcher 
finds for criminalisation as an effective measure to address this lacuna in hate speech regulation. 
The importance of complying with the international call for the criminalisation of hate speech is 
analysed. Insight is gained regarding what would be an effective model for criminalisation. Here 
lessons are taken from foreign comparatives that have successfully criminalised hate speech in 
the context of their cultural identity, history and social needs. Ultimately, a framework for 
effective hate speech criminalisation in South Africa is formulated.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCING HATE SPEECH AND ITS LIMITATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
„We hate what we fear and so where hate is, fear is lurking.‟1  
Cyril Connolly 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Understanding the workings of human rights as a multi-faceted reality remains a constant 
challenge for those engaged in the legal field. The limitation of human rights is a controversial, 
yet essential part of human rights jurisprudence. This study investigates the interaction between 
freedoms and limitations in relation to free political expression and hate speech. The premise that 
freedom of political expression is an integral right in democratic dispensations is rarely 
challenged. The extent of that freedom when it is exercised in the territory of hate speech is an 
issue that is widely debated.  
 
The importance of a right is indicated by the resistance to its limitation. The recent upsurge in 
hate speech litigation in South Africa highlights the need for a thorough analysis of the legal 
safeguards that protect against the negative effects of hate speech, as found in the common law 
and current legislative measures.
2
   
 
Hate speech has often served as a conduit instrument to further genocide and serious crimes 
against humanity such as apartheid amongst others.
3
  While absolutists hold that hate speech 
serves an important purpose in the democratic process and that it should be protected regardless 
of its possible negative consequences,
4
 the victims of the Holocaust,
5
 the 1994 Rwanda 
Genocide
6
 and apartheid crimes do not agree. When the exercise of one human right begins to 
                                                 
1
 Murphy 2715 One-Line Quotations for Speakers, Writers & Raconteurs (1996) 101. 
2
 Mephisto BVerf GE 173 (1971). 
3
 Dovell http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2010/11/11/hate-speech-leads-genocide (Date of use 12/09/2011). 
4
 Wilson 1993 (1033-2) University of Tulsa para 16. 
5
 Leventhal http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/holocaust/basichist.html  (Date of use 12/09/2011).  
6
 Amnesty Report http://www.internationallawbureau.com/blog/?p=1698 (Date of use 12/09/2011). 
10 
 
manifest in negative and destructive ways and becomes counterproductive, one is reminded of 
the importance of limitation and the role government plays in overseeing the limitation of human 
rights.
7
   
  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) conceptualises freedom of expression as 
follows in article 19: 
 
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions 
without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.
8
 
 
Freedom of expression is therefore defined as the right to express one‟s beliefs, ideas and 
opinions without unwarranted restriction.
9
 During the reign of the apartheid government freedom 
of expression was often severely limited and the voice of those involved in the struggle for 
freedom was silenced in favour of governmental ideology through numerous laws enacted to 
achieve this agenda.
10
  The risks involved in legislating on freedom of expression are duly noted.  
 
The constitutional drafters modelled the right to freedom of expression in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa (1996 Constitution) on articles 19 and 20 of the UDHR and the 
importance of freedom of expression in the new South African democracy is affirmed and 
guaranteed in section 16(1): 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, which includes   
a. freedom of the press and other media;  
b. freedom to receive or impart information or ideas;  
c. freedom of artistic creativity; and  
d. academic freedom and freedom of scientific research.
11
 
                                                 
7
 Koskenniemi http://www. humanity journal.org/humanity-volume-1-issue-1/human-rights-mainstreaming-strategy-
institutional-power  (Date of use 12/09/2011) 49-50. 
8
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). 
9
 The Free Dictionary http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Freedom+of+Speech (Date of use 12/09/2011). 
10
 Van Wyk et al Rights and Constitutionalism: The New South African Legal Order (1994) 2. Apartheid is the 
ideology of the former pre-democratic South African government and consisted of a policy of racial segregation 
which advocated the separation of peoples and resources.  
11
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
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This guarantee represents a decisive move away from governmental abuse but at the same time 
the necessity of and susceptibility to possible limitation of this right, are highlighted by the 
modification in section 16(2). It demarcates certain forms of expression that do not fall within 
the ambit of the guaranteed right in section 16(1). Section 16(2) stipulates the following: 
2. The right in subsection (1) does not extend to   
e. propaganda for war;  
f. incitement of imminent violence; or  
g. advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes 
incitement to cause harm.  
The constitutional drafters recognised certain forms of negative speech which do not further the 
democratic ideal and separated them constitutionally by not extending the protection of the 1996 
Constitution to these types of speech in the way that absolutist dispensations following the 
„liberal theory‟ do.12   
In defining freedom of expression, political expression and hate speech in the South African 
context, three assumptions are made for the purpose of this study. Freedom of expression is 
regarded as:   
 an innate human right which accrues to every individual as a result of birth13   
 a right that covers more than mere speech and includes all forms of expression, whether 
artistic, scientific, academic or of any other nature
14 
 
 not topically limited and could relate to any matter 
 
The nature of hate speech makes it difficult to define unambiguously. Hate speech can broadly 
be defined as words and other forms of expression that are deemed threatening, abusive, 
insulting and degrading
15
 and that promote „hatred, distrust and strife on political, racial, ethnic 
                                                 
12
 Currie & De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) 359. 
13
 Roman law proposed that personhood begins at birth and it is at this point that the individual is endowed with 
human rights. Gray The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia (1999) 832.  
14
 Currie & De Waal n 12 362. In their analysis of freedom of expression the authors include dancing, photography, 
sculpting, physical gestures such as finger-pointing and even flag burning as forms of expression. 
15
 Definition derived from section 5 of the United Kingdom‟s Public Order Act 1986. 
12 
 
or religious grounds‟.16 Hate speech encompasses speech that propositions, calls for or incites 
hatred which is „an extreme emotion‟.17  In South Africa two elements must be present 
concurrently in order for any utterance to qualify as hate speech: incitement to imminently cause 
injury/damage and the advocacy of hatred based on „race, ethnicity, gender or religion‟.18  Hate 
speech is closely related to political expression, which is a form of protected speech under 
section 16(1). 
 
Political expression entails all forms of expression that are concerned with partisan interests,
19 
governance, politics or the state.
20
  One should distinguish between politically important 
communication and „politically correct‟ communication.21  Information is regarded as „politically 
correct‟ if it is viewed as „officially agreeable‟.22  Politically important information falls within 
the ambit of political expression as it is information that „stirs public thought, provokes public 
controversy, or converts [the] public‟s (sic) minds‟.23  Free political expression includes 
advocating, governmental criticism, deliberation, evaluation, propaganda as well as 
electioneering and it is integral to a fully functioning democracy.
24
   
 
When political expression takes on the form of hate speech the question becomes one of 
limitation instead of protection, which has given rise to the research questions in this study.  
 
1.2 Research questions 
 
This research study will explore the tension between hate speech and free political expression 
and will aim to answer the following questions: 
 Should freedom of expression, when manifesting as hate speech, be limited? 
                                                 
16
 Definitional elements obtained from Prosecutor v Dario Kordic & Mario Cerkez (2001) ICTY 3. 
17
 Currie & De Waal n 12 375. 
18
 Currie & De Waal n 12 375. 
19
 Hawkins et al The Oxford Study Dictionary (1992) 497. 
20
 Hawkins n 19 528. 
21
 Braun Democracy Off Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate Propaganda Law in Canada (2004) 37. 
22
 Braun n 21 37. 
23
 Braun n 21 37. 
24
 Nelson Beyond the First Amendment:  The Politics of Free Speech and Pluralism (2005) 41 and 57. 
13 
 
 Are the limitations placed on hate speech in terms of section 16(2) of the 1996 
Constitution, common law remedies and current legislation sufficient to limit hate 
speech? 
If the above-mentioned forms of limitation are not sufficient, this indicates a lacuna left by the 
section 16(2) modification of freedom of expression.
25
  If further limitation is deemed to be 
necessary in the South African context, the final question to be answered is: 
 Should this lacuna in hate speech regulation be filled with criminalising legislation? 
In order to arrive at a finding for criminalisation, the study examines whether or not a duty rests 
on the state to punish hate speech perpetrators. If such a duty exists it confirms a need for 
criminalisation and clear punitive measures. If it is not possible to formulate an effective 
criminal sanction for hate speech the question becomes void and therefore the study investigates 
the following subordinate questions: Is it possible to criminalise hate speech effectively through 
legislation? Can the legislation be written to clearly distinguish between which forms of 
expressions are criminal and which forms are not?  Should culture and history influence the 
content of criminalising legislation to avoid the recurrence of historical realities? 
 
1.3 Chapter layout 
 
Chapter 2 discusses the theoretical frameworks that underlie freedom of expression, analysing 
the difference between libertarianism and absolutism. It seeks clarity why hate speech should or 
should not be limited by analysing the importance of freedom of political expression and the 
arguments in favour of limitation of certain forms of expression. The conceptual question, 
namely when does free political expression turn into hate speech, is answered through the 
definitional analysis. The ways in which hate speech can be limited are investigated and the ideal 
manner of limitation for South Africa is explored. Chapter 2 then analyses whether limitation of 
hate speech is needed in the South African context. Insight is gained into the South African 
cultural connection and its impact on the legislature‟s predisposition to criminalise certain forms 
of expression.
26
   
                                                 
25
Teichner 2003 (19) SAJHR 1. Internal modifiers entail possible rights curtailments which are written into the 
document that grants the right. 
26
 Olsen 2011 (44) British Journal of Aesthetics 125. The cultural connection is what Olsen terms a „mode of 
historical interpretation‟ and it implies an interpretative restraint because of certain historical realities. 
14 
 
 
Chapter 3 reviews the international position on the criminalisation of hate speech through an 
inspection of universal and regional treaties in order to adhere to section 39(1) of the 
Constitution. This chapter goes on to discuss foreign comparatives and the manner in which they 
have dealt with hate speech. It draws on case law and legislation on how to approach, interpret 
and limit hate speech successfully while preserving the democratic ideal. The chapter concludes 
with a framework for effective criminalisation, constructed from the various foreign 
comparatives studied and designed to serve as guidance for effective South African hate speech 
legislation. 
 
In chapter 4 the writer attempts to show that the identified lacuna left by the modification of 
section 16 of the 1996 Constitution, the current insufficient common law and legislative 
remedies on hate speech needs to be filled by criminalising legislation. An analysis of South 
African case law dealing with hate speech is undertaken to gain insight into the South African 
cultural connection and libertarian approach to the limitation of freedom of expression. Current 
legislation safeguarding against hate speech such as the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act (PEPUDA)
27
 and proposed legislation such as the Draft Hate Speech 
Bill (DHSB)
28
 are analysed to ascertain their possible shortcomings. A possible way forward is 
formulated through an investigation of the mechanisms of redress which could be utilised in 
order to obtain the most effective limitation result that will protect the spirit and purport of the 
1996 Constitution.    
 
Chapter 5 concludes the research study, offering suggestions as to the most effective measures of 
redress for hate speech perpetrations in South Africa. It draws on international, foreign and local 
experience to constructively formulate a suggested legislative framework for South African hate 
speech limitation through criminalisation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
28
 Draft
 
Prohibition of Hate Speech Bill 2004. 
15 
 
1.4 Research rationale: A possible lacuna in hate speech regulation  
 
Protected speech consists of forms of speech and expressions as contemplated in section 16(1) 
and is subject to reasonable constraints in terms of general limitation clauses and if applicable 
„internal or special limitations‟ whereas unprotected speech consists of forms of speech and 
expression that fall outside constitutional protection as a result of internal modifications.
29
 
 
The general limitation clause in section 36 protects right bearers from arbitrary and 
unconstitutional limitation of rights.
30
 Section 16(2) represents a modified model of freedom of 
expression which affirms that the constitutional drafters were of the opinion that the right to 
freedom of expression can and should be limited.
31
 A detailed analysis of this assumption 
follows in chapter 2.  
 
Constitutional protection is therefore not extended to the forms of expression listed in section 
16(2) and Currie and De Waal are of the opinion that „[l]egal restrictions of speech falling into 
one of these categories are not limitations of freedom of expression and will require no 
justification‟ in terms of section 36.32 This means that once rights are modified they have been 
limited. These rights are then not protected by the constitution and the fairness test of the general 
limitation clause set out in section 36 will not apply. Should the legislature limit forms of section 
16(2) expression the right to freedom of expression will not be infringed. Limitation of hate 
speech as contemplated in section 16(2)(c) is therefore deemed justifiable and does not represent 
a limitation of freedom of expression. The limitation is rather found in the modification of 
section 16. Currie and De Waal are correct in their interpretation that no justification in terms of 
                                                 
29
 Teichner n 25 2.  
30
 „1.The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that 
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including   
a. the nature of the right;  
b. the importance of the purpose of the limitation;  
c. the nature and extent of the limitation;  
d. the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
e. less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.‟ 
31
 Teichner n 25 1. Rights can be afforded without limitation (limitable by general limitation clauses), internally 
modified/demarcated or with „special limitations‟ which limit the right textually and from inception. Demarcations 
are synonymous with internal modifications: It is a textual qualification found within a declaration that affords the 
rights which distinguishes and defines the scope of the right.  
32
 Currie & De Waal n 12 372. 
16 
 
section 36 is needed for the limitation, which supports the presumption of a lacuna in hate 
speech regulation.  
 
The internal modifier placed on freedom of expression in section 16(2) distinguishes the types of 
expression that are not constitutionally protected. The modification in section 16(2)(c) does not 
bar hate speech from inception nor does it criminalise hate speech through a „special 
limitation‟.33 Hate speech has therefore been left open for further more stringent forms of 
limitation. The need for legislative intervention and ultimately criminalisation is analysed in 
chapters 3 and 4. 
 
Judicial interpretation of freedom of expression defines the boundaries of the right.
34
 In South 
Africa this currently takes place at the hand of the constitution, common law remedies and 
legislation such as PEPUDA, which imposes a civil liability for hate speech perpetrations. If 
these remedies are insufficient safeguards against the negative effects of hate speech this is 
confirmation that there is a lacuna which should be filled with alternative forms of limitation. 
This question will be analysed in chapter 2 and answered in chapter 4 of this study. The writer 
attempts to establish that a lacuna exists in the South African common law remedies and that 
current legislation dealing with hate speech is insufficient, thereby affirming the need for further 
criminalising legislation.  
 
1.4  Research design  
 
1.4.1  Research approach 
 
In section 39(1) of the 1996 Constitution the drafters of the Constitution made it clear that:  
 
1.When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum   
                                                 
33
 Teichner n 25 2. When a form of expression is not barred from inception it means that it is still possible to express 
oneself in that manner (it is not a crime per se) but the specific expression cannot claim constitutional protection 
when it imposes on the rights of others. In a rights balancing process no value will be attached to such a form of 
expression. 
34
 Botha Statutory Interpretation: An Introduction for Students 4
th
 ed (2005) 65. 
17 
 
a. must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom;  
b. must consider international law; and  
c. may consider foreign law.  
 
As a result, in any analysis of rights it is mandatory to consider international law instruments and 
it is left open as an option to consider foreign law in order to arrive at a definitive answer on the 
debated question. When investigating freedom of expression one should begin with an analysis 
of the two opposing theoretical continuums: Those who conservatively oppose absolute freedom 
of expression (libertarianism)
35
 versus those who promote freedom of expression absolutely 
(absolutism).
36
 These viewpoints are discussed in detail in chapter 2.  
 
 Bearing section 39(1)(c) of the 1996 Constitution in mind, Canada, Germany and Kenya were 
selected as foreign libertarian comparatives and the United States of America (USA) was 
selected as an absolutist opposite. The Canadian Charter serves as a good liberalist comparative 
for the South African model in that its general limitation clause, found in section 1, is similar to 
section 36 of the South African Constitution.
37
  The German Basic Law serves as an excellent 
conservative liberalist comparative since it is a model that is internally modified in its section 
5(2) construction of freedom of expression, which is correlative to the South African section 
16.
38
 In addition, Germany shares a historical background of rights abuses with South Africa. 
Kenya is selected as African libertarian comparative sharing historical and cultural parallels with 
South Africa.  
 
The USA espouses the opposing absolutist view, with an unmodified model of freedom of 
expression and no over-riding general limitation clause. The USA‟s long-standing history of 
litigation on freedom of expression has been helpful in this study by throwing light on the 
interpretation of difficult concepts and supplying guidance for specific applications. In order to 
                                                 
35
 McDougal & Littell Webster’s High School Dictionary (1986) 516. Definition derived from libertarian, libertine 
and liberty. 
36
 Nelson n 24 3.  
37
 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982. 
38
 Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (as amended by the Unification Treaty of 31/08/1990 and Federal 
Statute 23/09/1990). An example of this internal demarcation approach can be found in art 5(2), which limits the 
right to freedom of expression as follows: „These rights are limited by the provisions of the general laws, the 
provisions of law for the protection of youth, and by the right to inviolability of personal honour.‟ 
18 
 
give adherence to section 39(1)(b) of the 1996 Constitution, generally applicable international 
law will be analysed. This comparative study follows in chapter 3.       
 
The current and proposed legislative measures such as PEPUDA and the DHSB are scrutinised 
in chapter 4. Judicial decisions on the remedies afforded by the Constitution, PEPUDA and the 
common law are studied in order to affirm the existence of the lacuna in hate speech regulation. 
Based on South Africa‟s libertarian predisposition as clarified in chapter 2, and drawing on the 
foreign and international instruments, laws and cases studied in chapter 3, a possibly effective 
model for legislating on hate speech is formulated. Such an analysis needs to be done to adhere 
to section 39(2), which mandates that: 
 
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
 
Inevitably there is a risk that political expression will change into hate speech, and occasionally 
into incitement to imminent violence, and at its worst into war propaganda. The question is: Up 
to what point should freedom of political expression be protected? When does political 
expression change into an unprotected and dangerous form of speech which is counter-
democratic? How and when does the state limit freedom of political expression that manifests as 
possible hate speech? These conceptual questions will be analysed and discussed in detail in 
chapter 2. Once the need for limitation has been established the sociological question as to 
whether criminalisation is an effective measure of redress, particularly for South Africa, will be 
addressed in chapter 4.  
   
1.4.2 Research methodology 
 
The research methodology is a non-empirical study taking the form of an in-depth literature 
review.
39
 The literature study includes the review of case law (international, foreign and local), 
books, articles, journals, Acts (foreign and local) and international human rights instruments. The 
researcher uses meta-analytical questioning to investigate the key debates surrounding freedom 
                                                 
39
 Mouton How to succeed in your Master’s and Doctoral Studies: A South African Guide and Resource Book 
(2001) 53. 
19 
 
of political expression and hate speech.
40
 Philosophical questioning is used to ascertain the 
necessity of limiting hate speech in the South African context and the possible lacuna evident in 
current common law and the legislative measures in place alongside the 1996 Constitution.
41
 
Finally, philosophical questioning is used to investigate the optimum approach to limitation 
through possible criminalisation in a democratic society with reference to practical examples 
from international law instruments and the selected foreign law comparatives.  
 
1.5  Conclusion 
 
Freedom of political expression is an important mode of democratic mobilisation but a balance 
must be struck between protecting political expression and furthering hate speech with its 
inherent risk of escalation into other more serious crimes. This study aims to establish whether a 
lacuna exists within South African hate speech regulation and proposes to suggest an effective 
model for regulating this phenomenon while preserving the spirit of freedom of expression. 
 
  
                                                 
40
 Mouton n 39 54. 
41
 Mouton n 39 55. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
POLITICAL EXPRESSION versus HATE SPEECH:  
Definitional analysis and the need for limitation from a constitutional law perspective 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 1 established the interaction between freedom of political expression and hate speech. 
The reason for the existence of freedom of expression in democratic dispensations will now be 
explored. The philosophies which underlie freedom of expression, identified as absolutism and 
libertarianism, are analysed in chapter 2 in order to aid the understanding of the probable need 
for the limitation of certain forms of expression.  
 
Negative manifestations of freedom of expression such as hate speech are introduced along with 
the possible need for the limitation of these forms of expression. Defences for the limitation of 
freedom of expression, as it applies in libertarian dispensations, are studied and this is followed 
by a detailed analysis of the manner in which limitation can be effected.  
 
The chapter concludes with an analysis of the need for limitation in the South African context in 
order to effectively regulate hate speech and its negative effects while preserving the spirit and 
purport of the Bill of Rights. 
 
2.2 Theories underlying freedom of expression 
 
Understanding legal realities begins with analysing the theories that underlie them. Absolutism 
and libertarianism represent the two opposite sides of the continuum and are discussed in order 
to gain insight into the opinions of those who oppose and those who support the limitation of 
certain forms of expression. 
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2.2.1 Absolutism 
  
Absolutism represents a radical rightist perception that freedom of expression is the most 
pervasive and important human right, taking precedence over all other rights in an incontestable 
manner.
42
 Free speech absolutism proposes an unwavering protection for all speech.
43
 Content, 
opinion or manner does not influence the presence of protection.
44
 This form of radicalism 
proposes that „speech can never be regulated by the state, even in an effort to balance speech 
against other values‟.45   
 
Absolutism is contradictory to the UDHR‟s article 1, which states that: 
 
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
  
 
Declaring one individual‟s right to be more important than that of another individual or the rights 
of society at large undermines the spirit of brotherhood. Equality of rights, which implies that all 
rights are equally important, is a safeguard embedded in human rights jurisprudence. At the first 
conference on human rights, held in Teheran in 1968 by the United Nations (UN), it was held 
that human rights and freedoms are „indivisible‟ and inherently equal.46 If equality of rights is 
compromised and one right is favoured above another, balancing of rights does not take place. 
Rather, it gives way to an attempt to give precedence to one right over others illegitimately.
47
 
Absolutism is in line with the individualistic notion of rights but is not entirely reconcilable with 
the spirit of human rights.
48
 
 
Absolutist dispensations therefore deny that there is value in limiting negative forms of 
expression such as hate speech in order to preserve democratic values.
49
 The USA serves as an 
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example of pure absolutism and is studied as a foreign comparative opposite, in order to fully 
comprehend the intricacies of limiting freedom of expression.
50
   
 
2.2.2 Libertarianism 
 
Libertarianism is an individualistic predisposition which advocates the dogma of free will while 
upholding the following ideal: Thought and actions are emancipated without moral constraint but 
are not separate from the societal ideal.
51
 Libertarianism therefore supports free expression but at 
the same time recognises reasons for restraint.
52
  
 
Thomas Jefferson stated that freedom of religion, speech and the press is tripartite and „whatever 
violates either throws down the sanctuary which covers the others‟.53 Cram supports this view by 
identifying the interconnectivity between rights and pointing to the fact that freedom of 
expression cannot be viewed as a stand-alone, superior right that trumps all other rights.
54
 The 
libertarian view recognises the importance of the right to freedom of expression as it exists 
simultaneously with other fundamental rights and, as Jefferson stated, as a right that is at times 
inseparable from other rights.
55
 In an analysis of rights one cannot separate and view one right in 
isolation; its interaction with other rights must be considered.  
 
Libertarianism is aligned with John Locke‟s naturalist perception of the right to freedom of 
expression.
56
 Freedom of expression as a natural right is one of those rights which „appertain to 
man in right of his existence‟.57 Proponents of this construction „wish to put the desirability of 
certain liberties beyond the ups and downs of political deliberations and positive law‟.58 The 
naturalist perception claims that freedom of expression as an absolute right is a far-fetched 
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ideology. Limiting freedoms does not extinguish them, but overrules them in favour of a 
weightier consideration.
59
   
 
Naturalism and libertarianism are interconnected with the pluralist ideology which promotes a 
position where free speech values political debate but at the same time applies judgment in 
ascertaining its boundaries.
60
 Libertarianism supports limitation of freedom of expression in 
certain circumstances and favours the idea of balancing rights as opposed to hierarchically 
classifying rights.
61
 Libertarianism consequently acknowledges that hate speech should possibly 
be limited.  
 
2.3 The need for the existence of freedom of expression 
 
Emerson is of the opinion that freedom of expression is integral to effective governance, stable 
communities and self-fulfilment but at the same time complete and universal acceptance of 
freedom of expression is absent, which confirms the right‟s susceptibility to limitation.62 
Bloustein formulates Emerson‟s opinion in four premises upon which freedom of expression 
rests:
63
 
 Freedom of expression is essential for self-fulfilment.64 
 Freedom of expression is integral to learning and development through truth discovery. 
 Freedom of expression is integral in the societal decision making process. 
 Freedom of expression is the glue that enables stable community formation. 
Included in the third premise is the concept of the „marketplace of ideas‟65 and the fourth premise 
supports the idea that freedom of expression is integral if stable democracies are to form and 
continue to exist.
66
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The academic father of the truth discovery school of thought is Milton, who argued as a 
libertarian that truth is the driving force behind freedom of expression.
67
 He spoke of the 
„marketplace of ideas‟ which must be freely explored to ultimately discover the truth. The 
„marketplace of ideas‟ is a continuation of the economic free market system which allows for 
free trading of all products between market participants to stimulate economic growth and 
development.
68
 Theoretically „free trading of ideas‟ would result in democratic growth and 
ultimately self-realisation.  
  
As Milton assumes truth to be the central premise to freedom of expression, speech that is not 
true can and possibly should be limited.
69
 Truth is defined as a statement having the 
characteristic of „being in accord with reality‟.70 It encompasses fidelity, constancy and 
sincerity.
71
 Libertarianism that takes a consequentialist view argues that in order to justify 
freedom of speech it must serve a purpose and have positive consequences; if not, it should 
rightfully be limited.
72
 The political debate between state and citizen will aid truth discovery, 
which ultimately gives the citizen all the relevant information needed to make his political 
choices.
73
  The importance of the political debate affirms the need for freedom of political 
expression, but this does not extend to hate speech.  
 
Political expression should possibly be regarded as the most imperative form of expression as it 
is the citizen‟s main way of communicating governmental grievances through public debate and 
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vice versa the government‟s vehicle for communicating its mode of governance.74 The truth 
argument proposed that individuals should be allowed the constant opportunity to express how 
they wish to be governed but that government should be at liberty to communicate its policies 
and procedures to its subjects sincerely. This process of reciprocal fidelity will aid the ultimate 
discovery of truth in the „marketplace of ideas‟ and will thereby further advancement towards 
self-actualisation.
75
  
 
Dworkin as an absolutist opposes limitation of freedom of expression and identifies two 
categories of defence for freedom of expression, namely constructive and instrumental.
76
 As is 
evident from the name, the instrumental approach sees freedom of expression as a means to an 
end, a vehicle that has a purpose and that can achieve something for mankind.
77
 The defence is 
therefore structured around what freedom of expression can do for people and their development 
in this process of „truth discovery‟.78 The constructive defence category proposes that freedom of 
expression is an integral part of being human.
79
 Dworkin implies that freedom of expression 
builds humanness and cannot be severed from it. Through his two defences Dworkin therefore 
implies that freedom of expression exists because it aids human development and is an inherent 
part of the human condition. 
 
As a libertarian De Spinoza affirms the need for and importance of free political expression as a 
channel for democracy.
80
 He defends free speech with the exception of expressions that „by their 
very nature nullify‟ the concept and spirit of freedom of expression as a human right, such as 
hate speech, war propaganda and incitement to cause harm.
81
 According to De Spinoza, hate 
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speech is demeaning and undignified speech which undermines the self-development of the 
audience and therefore cannot be protected by the law.
82
  This view proposes that self-
actualisation is achieved through positive expression that adds societal value and aids truth 
discovery.  
 
Libertarianism promotes the equal protection of the self-actualisation of both the audience and 
the speaker.
83
 Langa DCJ embeds this view in South African law in Islamic Unity, warning 
against absolute freedom of expression under the guise of political emancipation which could 
result in societal demise and inequality in rights.
84
 Equality of rights aims to avoid the 
contradictory position where the self-actualisation of one right bearer (the speaker) trumps the 
self-actualisation of another right bearer (the audience), a situation which represents the 
absolutist sentiment of the USA.
85
  Self-actualisation as a defence for freedom of expression is 
inherently ill-conceived and contradictory as it claims to be important for one right bearer (the 
speaker) at the expense of another right bearer (the audience). 
 
Freedom of political expression is regarded as a cornerstone civil liberty in democratic 
dispensations.
86
 Political expression is needed to mobilise democratic development and to aid 
the advancement of a nation‟s political process.87 Van der Westhuizen identifies the protection 
of public morale as an integral and essential part of a functioning democracy.
88
 Negative speech 
such as hate speech which adversely affects public morale could therefore be interpreted as 
being counter-democratic. Absolutism almost proposes that freedom of expression embodies the 
entire democratic ideal but libertarianism offers a more balanced view, taking cognisance of the 
fact that freedom of expression is „accompanied by statements of other fundamental rights and 
freedoms‟.89   
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Freedom of expression is therefore seen as part and parcel of democratic values but does not 
represent democracy in its entirety. However, both libertarianism and absolutism affirm the 
value of freedom of expression in democratic dispensations. What differentiates the two is the 
fact that absolutism proposes no limitation whereas libertarianism does propose a limitation; 
they both base their argument on the need to preserve democracy. This tension must be analysed 
in detail in order to identify whether there is a need to limit certain forms of expression. 
 
2.4 Negative forms and manifestations of free political expression  
 
The constitutional drafters have identified hate speech, war propaganda and incitement to 
imminent violence as negative forms of speech that are not constitutionally protected in section 
16(2). For the purposes of this research study, a link is made between freedom of political 
expression and hate speech with possible incitement to cause harm because the nature of political 
expression makes it susceptible to being transformed into one of the 16(2)(c) forms of 
unprotected speech.
90
     
 
Braun is of the opinion that defining hate speech is a cumbersome and virtually impossible 
task.
91
 The language used to express this so-called hate may conceal „related concerns in the 
package of a singular goal‟ and if classified as hate speech in its entirety, it can easily be 
subjected to governmental censorship bias.
92
 This content analysis problem, which is due to the 
often „troublesome mix‟ of expressions that is included in the package, is best left to the courts 
to unravel.
93
 Hate speech can only be identified if it is read in context, taking all the facts and 
circumstances into consideration. Legislating on and defining hate speech clinically seems a 
virtually impossible task when it is removed from its context. This is a strong argument against 
the criminalisation of hate speech.
94
 Judicial interpretation of the common law remedies, read 
with the constitutional modification of the right to freedom of expression in section 16(2), is 
offered as a plausible alternative to hate speech criminalisation but it is unclear whether the 
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current common law remedies offer sufficient cause of action.
95
 Without cause of action and 
effective guidance as to what exactly it is that the courts are guarding against the alternative 
becomes diluted.
96
   
 
Another problem that is part of the hate speech issue is that of time and circumstance.
97
 Subject 
matter that injured and caused harm to people immediately after the fall of apartheid may now 
no longer aggrieve recipients of the message, or alternatively, cause exponential injury.
98
 
Injuries are „time and circumstance dependent in political practice‟.99 The interpretation process 
therefore needs to be dynamic and take all the facts and circumstances into account along with 
the constantly evolving societal boni mores.  
 
All forms of political expression do not constitute hate speech and political expression has a 
pivotal role to play within the political process.
100
 It is „precisely because of its content‟ that 
political expression is so necessary and total exclusion is not feasible.
101
 It can be said that 
„freedom of political expression has never been fully realized in practice‟ owing to the continued 
modifications and limitations imposed on it.
102
 Limitations are, however, pivotal in order to 
avoid circumstances which are counter-democratic and do not take cognisance of dignity, 
freedom and equality.
103
 
 
Heyman is of the opinion that hate speech has limited value even if it is a form of political 
speech, as it usually victimises specific individuals and is not expressed for the greater good of 
society.
104
 The only value that can be seen in such types of expression is the marginal value that 
it has for the self-development of the expresser, albeit negative development. This type of speech 
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is usually channelled towards a marginalised group of individuals and it discourages their 
political interaction. Hate speech is furthermore destructive and contrary to the ideals of human 
rights as it infringes the core right of dignity.
105
 Heyman therefore argues that if speech does not 
have „positive value‟ it should not be able to claim constitutional protection.106   
 
When the original deliberators had to decide on how to formulate the UDHR, all of the proposals 
for the formulation of the right to freedom of expression „contained limitations which had been 
framed as permissive rather than obligatory‟.107 The reason for this is the need to preserve 
democracy while understanding that there is a constant imminent risk that certain types of 
political expression can take on the form of war propaganda, hate speech or incitement to 
imminent violence, among other forms of negative expression. 
 
After hate speech the second possible negative manifestation of free political expression is war 
propaganda. In article 20(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
war propaganda is prohibited through legislative measures made mandatory in the hands of the 
sovereign legislatures in article 20(2).
108
 Smith argues that this inclusion is of „paramount 
importance to the realization of the purposes of the UN itself‟.109  The main purpose of the UN is 
the protection of international peace. The travaux préparatoires, the antecedent to the UDHR 
and ICCPR, viewed penal provisions as the „most suitable and perhaps the only effective means‟ 
to achieve the prohibition of war propaganda, which is internationally regarded as destructive 
conduct.
110
 The manner and form of limitation are left open to each sovereign state.  
 
A third possible negative manifestation of free political speech is incitement to imminent 
violence. Braun makes it clear that „social incitement‟ is a valuable ingredient in the recipe for a 
democratic society.
111
 This form of expression clarifies the intensity and depth of the discontent 
which helps to define a political position and social stance.
112
 The South African model does not 
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deny the value of provocative social talk, but places communication that incites to imminent 
violence outside the protection of the 1996 Constitution.   
 
The concept of a constitutional crime now warrants attention.
113
 Currie and De Waal are of the 
opinion that section 16(2)(b) cannot be interpreted as a sanction to criminalise speech that incites 
violence.
114
 The 1996 Constitution does not in any way criminalise unprotected speech. Under 
current South African law the aftermath of the speech, if manifesting in actual acts of violence, 
could constitute crimes such as malicious injury to property, assault or murder etc. The 
modification in section 16 indicates that there is scope for further limitation and in consequence 
the option of criminalisation is available to the legislature. 
  
When political expression incites the masses to take action and mobilise themselves towards a 
greater political ideal, such speech should be protected. When it does so accompanied by 
instigation to commit violent acts, the libertarian view is one of disallowance. The very nature of 
political expression makes it susceptible to becoming one of the three previously mentioned 
forms of unprotected speech. Emerson‟s analysis that freedom of political expression is an 
integral part of the political process is correct. His absolutist opinion stating that: 
 
No matter what dangers may arise from permitting full freedom of expression they can scarcely justify the 
resolution of our problems by repression and force. But imagination and resourcefulness will be required to 
realize the full potentialities of political freedom under existing conditions of modern times...
 115
 
 
is regarded as counter-democratic. By ignoring the menace that often hides within the content of 
political expression, a state runs the risk of anarchy or sponsored minority oppression. 
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2.5  Defences for limiting freedom of expression in libertarian dispensations 
 
The following three defences for the limitation of freedom of political expression that manifests 
as hate speech are identified: 
 the harm principle 
 the offence principle 
 naturalism and its „social contract‟ theory116 
 
Harm involves a „perception of injury‟ and may be either physical or mental. It generally 
causes damage or loss to another.
117
 Mill argued that liberty and the power to rule are two 
competing forces but that one cannot exist without the other.
118
 He is of the opinion that 
absolute freedom in the liberty of expression is imperative for societal discourse, a view 
which almost equates to absolutism.
119
 His libertarian orientation is, however, reflected in 
the construction of his harm principle, which states that there is only one legitimate reason to 
exercise power over a member of a civil community and that is to prevent harm to the other 
members of the society.
120
 Limitation is therefore in order if it prevents injury or damage to 
another which could take the form of either mental or physical harm.121    
     
Feinberg as a libertarian is of the opinion that not only harm but also offence should act as a 
restricting factor when it comes to hate speech.
122
 Offence includes elements of „annoyance, 
displeasure, or resentment‟ and is less severe than the injury implied by harm.123 Offence can 
entail an affront or insult but does not necessarily go as far as to cause damage. Feinberg 
formulated his offence principle somewhat more conservatively, stating that the harm principle 
is not exhaustive and too open in its formulation, allowing too much freedom.
124
 Varying 
degrees of limitation should therefore apply and should be correlated with the degrees of 
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encroachment.
125
 If harm has been caused to another person, the extent of the limitation should 
be greater than if mere offence was present.  
 
Pinto agrees with this approach, arguing „that some claims of offence to feelings boil down to a 
struggle for equality in the public sphere between competing cultural identities‟.126 This implies 
that offence can be seen as an identifier of feelings of inequality. Cultural identities can vary 
from religious to ethnic or even to sexual preference groups.
127
 Each of these cultural identities 
therefore has their own „way of life‟ which causes a struggle when their identities are balanced 
against that of another cultural croup.
128
 Rights need to apply equally and consistently in order to 
achieve the ideology that underlies human rights: It befalls man because he is man.
129
 
 
Feinberg therefore aligns himself with conservative libertarianism, believing limitation for the 
sake of the audience‟s rights is just as important as freedom is for the sake of the speaker‟s self-
actualisation.
130
 This principle is difficult to apply in practice and is best used at the hand of the 
objective reasonable person test, as different people are offended by different things and 
oversensitivity, „bigotry and unjustified prejudice‟ could hamper its implementation.131   
 
As a naturalist Hobbes was of the opinion that reciprocity in recognition is the basis for societal 
formation.
132
 The very premise behind the „social contract‟ is to escape the original point of 
„universal hostility‟ by state governance in order to avoid societal destruction as a result of 
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competition.
133
 The protection of hate speech is an absurd notion within Hobbes‟s perception of 
society: 
 
The expression of hatred or contempt for others, or the refusal to acknowledge their equal status of rights, 
violates fundamental principles of natural law by making the establishment of peace and society between 
them impossible.
134
   
 
As hate speech arises from hostility it cannot be protected when a naturalist view of fundamental 
rights is supported.
135
 John Locke advocated the disallowance of hate speech, albeit indirectly, in 
his Letter Concerning Toleration of religious freedom.
136
 Legal protection of hate speech as a 
form of political expression would therefore not be in line with a naturalistic orientation of the 
law and should be denied.
137
   
 
Heyman gives three reasons why hate speech is not a defensible form of speech and should be 
limited in terms of the naturalist argument: Firstly, hate speech violates the requirement of 
respect for others that is a central premise within the „social contract‟ theory.138 Secondly, the 
injuries caused by malicious hate speech outweigh the value that hate speech has as political 
speech
139
 and, finally, hate speech violates the duty of recognition that each citizen incurs as a 
result of the „social contract‟ which puts him in the position of both ruler and ruled.140 
 
When viewed from both a naturalist and a libertarian perspective, there is a clear need to limit 
certain forms of expression and the ways in which limitation can be effected will now be 
investigated. 
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2.6 Ways in which freedom of expression and specifically hate speech is limited 
 
A natural consequence of rights entitlement is rights enjoyment.
141
  The actual application of 
rights entitlement is far more complex as limitation is inevitable when other right bearers enter 
the equation.
142
 The inevitable clash of rights, due to numerous right bearers interacting with one 
another, calls for the process of limitation within a societal structure and this requires 
compromise.
143
  
 
Five ways in which limitation of freedom of expression can be achieved have been identified:
144
 
 general limitation clauses embedded as a safeguard in documents regulating human rights 
 internal modifiers145 
 constitutional balancing of rights146 
 states of emergency 
 human duties147 
 
This section will analyse freedom of political expression and hate speech limitations at the hand 
of the five elements listed above.  
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2.6.1 General limitation clauses 
 
None of the rights and freedoms afforded in the 1996 Constitution or other human rights 
documents is absolute.
148
 The boundaries to individual rights are set by the rights of others and 
governmental freedoms afforded in the „social contract‟ of a society.149 Within this „social 
contract‟ some examples of factors that can legitimately limit a human right or freedom are the 
rights of others, the protection of adolescence and the greater good of society at large.
150
   
 
General limitation clauses are clauses that allow limitation of the absolute free application of 
rights in order to preserve democracy, balance, peace and social cohesion.
151
 Within the sphere 
of models of limitation, one finds a one-stage model or a two-stage model.
152
 What is 
characteristic of a two-stage model, such as the Canadian and South African models, is the idea 
that there is a „possibility of setting limits to rights‟ which are afforded within the document 
itself.
153
 In the Canadian Charter rights and freedoms are made subject „only to such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society‟.154 
During the first stage the question is whether or not the right exists and, concurrently, what the 
scope of the right entails.
155
 The conceptual question would therefore be whether the right to 
freedom of political expression exists and what the extent of free political expression is. 
Therefore what the first stage does is to ascertain the character and scope of the right that is 
protected, establishing a safeguard of protection around the right.
156
 
 
The second stage only comes into play once the first stage has identified a possible infringement. 
The second stage involves ascertaining whether this identified interference is justifiable in the 
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light of the limitation rules.
157
 If justifiable, the limitation is in order and the scope of the right is 
diminished but if the infringement is not justifiable redress can be sought.158 
 
What the second stage would imply for freedom of political expression is that an answer should 
be sought to the following question: Is the law enacted justifiable within a free and open 
democratic society?  Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution is a good example of this two-stage 
model and is partly based on the Canadian decision in R v Oakes, where the Canadian court 
explained the two-stage model as firstly a guarantee of the rights afforded and in the second 
stage the criteria for the justification of limitation of those rights.
159
 In Islamic Unity
160
 the 
Constitutional Court (CC) made it clear that political expression will be subject to the limitation 
as provided in section 36(1) but not hate speech as it falls outside the constitutional protection of 
„dignity, equality and freedom‟ afforded in section 36 in terms of the scope limitation 
demarcated in section 16(2). 
161
 Currie and De Waal agree that hate speech can be limited from 
the onset as it is not covered by the section 36 general limitation clause.
162
 
 
A one-stage model, of which the US Constitution is an example, does not make provision for the 
distinction between „justified and non-justified interferences‟.163 A distinctive feature of this 
model is that is does not allow for limitation. The question whether the infringement was 
justifiable does not arise as the premise is simple: Interference is violation.
164
     
 
Baker explains the distinction between one-stage and two-stage models as follows: 
 
Those “absolutists” who reject limitation assert that the central task is to determine the content of 
fundamental rights. This task, of course, involves consideration of the rationale for or the justifiable 
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meaning of the right. In contrast, those who accept limitation assert that the appropriate legal inquiry must 
include consideration of other societal interest unrelated to the rationale of the right.
165
 
 
Within the South African two-stage model the societal interest that must be borne in mind is that 
of „dignity, equality and freedom‟. This is embedded in the 1996 Constitution as a result of South 
Africa‟s historical realities. The question thus becomes whether the infringement is justifiable in 
„an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom‟.        
 
One is next confronted with the relationship between general limitation clauses and internally 
modified rights. Section 36 of the 1996 Constitution
 
functions as an overriding control check for 
limitations where rights are not internally demarcated as opposed to, for example, the German 
Basic Law, which does not contain a stand-alone limitation clause,
166
 but which attaches internal 
mini-limitations to each specific right.
167
 Based on the analysis above, in South Africa, once the 
right is limited through an internal modifier such as section 16(2) it is no longer protected by the 
general limitation clause.  
 
Currie and  De Waal‟s interpretation was affirmed by the CC in Islamic Unity in the statement 
that regulation of expression can go beyond the three types of negative speech mentioned in 
section 16(2) only if this intrusion is in line with section 36(1).
168
 The Broadcasting Committee‟s 
stringent regulations did not survive the limitation test and the CC found it to be an unjustifiable 
infringement of freedom of political expression under section 16(1). The CC went on to call for 
legislation that would help tailor the borders of hate speech stipulating what is allowed and 
disallowed within the ambit of freedom of expression.
169
 This call for legislation clearly 
acknowledges the lacuna left by the section 16(2) exclusion of certain forms of expression which 
will be addressed in detail in chapter 4. 
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2.6.2  Internal modifiers 
 
Teichner distinguishes between internal modifiers and „internal or special limitations‟.170 Internal 
limitations provide a way of limiting the right from its origin, whereas internal modifiers place 
the action outside the scope of constitutional protection, as is the case with section 16(2). Internal 
modifiers entail possible rights curtailments that are written into the text of the document that 
grants the right.
171
 An internal modifier therefore sets the scope of the right whilst a special 
limitation is similar to the general limitation clause but applies solely to a specific right.  
 
Heyns is opposed to the use of demarcations and proposes that the right should exist freely 
without prior restraint, offering rights balancing as a sufficient answer to effective limitation.
172
 
If the construction of the right is limited by a special limitation Teichner is of the opinion that 
limitation in terms of a general limitation clause cannot apply.
173
 Teichner does not address the 
question whether general limitation clauses still apply to internally modified rights, as discussed 
above.    
 
In Islamic Unity the CC was clear in its analysis that section 16(2) merely sets „the boundaries 
beyond which the right to freedom of expression does not extend‟.174 Thus section 16(2) places 
certain forms of freedom of expression outside the realm of constitutional protection but does not 
limit the right of freedom of expression by, for example, disallowing all forms of hate speech 
through constitutional criminalisation. Further limitations placed on such forms of expression are 
left open for direction by the legislature; the need for this will be analysed in chapter 4.
175
  
 
Seleoane is of the opinion that even if a person engages in expression that advocates hatred, but 
which at the same time does not incite anyone to violence, such expression will still be protected 
by the 1996 Constitution.
176
 Van der Schyff opposed this opinion, agreeing with Currie and De 
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Waal, and arguing that the section 36 limitation clause applies to section 16(1) only and not to 
16(2). He identifies rights balancing as the most effective manner to conclude limitation.
177
 
 
2.6.3 Balancing of rights 
 
The balancing of rights involves analysing the content of rights, the contextual importance of the 
rights and the application of the rights. It implies a weighing process in which the interests of 
two different parties are weighed up against one another.
178
 It can involve the same right of two 
or more different individuals/institutions being compared and balanced or the balancing of two 
different rights of two or more individuals/institutions against one another.
179
 The latter applies 
most commonly to freedom of political expression and entails the „tension among the rights‟, 
which is both „inter- and intra-rights‟.180      
 
Each balancing of rights is therefore an indirect limitation on the rights involved in the analysis. 
Seleoane is of the opinion that the Vienna Declaration suggests that first prize is to make all 
rights work together.
181
 A practical example of rights balancing can be found in National Media, 
where dignity and freedom of expression had to be balanced against each other.
182
 Freedom of 
expression was upheld in this defamation case and the strict liability of the press offence was 
obliterated, balancing freedom of expression against dignity.
183
 The pronouncement disproves 
the fear that dignity will always trump freedom of expression in South Africa‟s cultural 
connection. This pronouncement does not in any way create some form -of pecking order which 
puts freedom of expression above other rights and all the facts and circumstances of each case 
will be decisive in determining whether a rights limitation is in order. As a rule no right weighs 
more heavily than another.       
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2.6.4 States of emergency 
 
Seleoane identifies states of emergency as a fourth means of limiting the right to freedom of 
political expression.
184
 According to section 37 of the 1996 Constitution, certain rights can be 
limited if the state of emergency calls for such action.
185
 A list of non-derogable rights can be 
found in section 37(5), which does not include the right to freedom of expression.
186
 During the 
apartheid era the South African government was quick to use states of emergency as an escape 
clause for the benefit of the apartheid agenda when government policies were opposed.
187
 As far 
as freedom of political expression is concerned, section 37 remains contentious and susceptible 
to abuse. When the opposition‟s voice becomes too loud a government can easily silence its 
opposition through manipulation of the system by declaring a state of emergency.     
 
Limitation in the ordinary sense and limitation in states of emergency should be distinguished 
from one another. When compelling and legitimate reasons exist, a general limitation clause 
provides an opportunity for the government to restrict and curb certain rights through legislative 
measures.
188
 In states of emergency the reality takes on a different form and in order to protect 
the „life of the nation‟ extraordinary measures may be necessary.189 Government is then 
empowered to impose greater restrictions in order to protect the Republic against threats. States 
of emergency should only ever be declared when absolutely necessary. According to section 
37(1)(a) this is in times of general insurrection, war, public disorder, natural disasters and public 
emergency. Political upheaval can easily be construed as general insurrection when it threatens 
to upset the status quo of the current government and it is in these times that freedom of 
expression should arguably be most protected. The right of protest is central to the democratic 
ideal and there will always be a loophole for governmental abuse if freedom of expression is not 
a guaranteed right during states of emergency.
190
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It is true that states of emergency can be declared in times of political liberation where the right 
to freedom of political expression is imperative to attain the revolutionary goal.
191
  The 
theoretical question whether political expression should have been included in the section 37(5) 
list of non-derogable rights is a suitable subject for a separate study.  
 
2.6.5 Human duties 
 
Rights do not exist without duties.
192
 In the sphere of private law subjective rights always have 
duties as their opposite pole as a result of the subject-object relationship that is embedded in 
private law.
193
 In the field of human rights law, this logical form of reciprocity is diminished. 
The academic sphere of legal philosophy offers the greatest insight into duty as a form of 
limitation. Raphael is firm in his opinion that human „rights bear a clear relationship to duties‟.194 
His view is rooted and originates in the „social contract‟.195 The „social contract‟ illustrates the 
operation and rationale of human cooperation within a society.
196
 The concept of human duty is 
firmly embedded within the natural rights ideology which has a major influence on politics, 
which is the antecedent to the law.
197
   
 
Human duty is therefore defined as the reciprocal duty of respect that a right bearer incurs as a 
result of rights entitlement.
198
 Minogue believes that human duties exist even in the absence of a 
contra-weight human right because a „moral, if not legal‟ duty of respect rests on right bearers.199 
If the Hobbesian „original position‟ is adopted a state is required to produce and maintain the 
reciprocities needed for the effective functioning and maintenance of rights and duties.
200
 This 
can only be achieved by the imposition of laws.  
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These duties of respect therefore limit the right bearer‟s completely free enjoyment of rights. 
Citizens have duties towards one another and these duties become a natural limitation on the 
right to freedom of political expression.
201
 Declarations of rights are therefore „duties of 
benevolence‟ which were designed to aid the poor and marginalised and improve the situation of 
those in weak bargaining positions when compared to the state and other right holders.
202
 As this 
form of limitation is based on self-restraint it is unlikely to be consistently effective. Human 
rights application is flawed when it allows individuals to claim rights while at the same time 
ignoring the duties that accompany the right entitlement.203 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
South Africa follows a libertarian model of freedom of political expression, promoting the value 
of such expression but at the same time being protective over all right bearers and society as a 
whole. There are four main arguments for the existence and protection of freedom of political 
expression, namely the democratic ideal, the search for truth, self-actualisation and the free 
„marketplace of ideas‟, which are encompassed within the South African libertarian view. 
 
If a naturalistic interpretation of freedom of expression is followed, limitation is deemed the 
natural consequence of rights entitlement. Justification for the limitation of freedom of political 
expression is to be found in the harm principle, the offence principle and naturalism itself. 
Secondary to these are factors such as the protection of minorities in weak bargaining positions, 
social cohesion and the negative value of certain forms of expression. Within a libertarian 
dispensation it is clear that limitation of hate speech is mandatory and not discretionary. 
 
As limitation is deemed both allowable and necessary in South Africa, the manner in which 
limitation can take place was discussed and identified as general limitation clauses, internal 
modifiers, rights balancing, states of emergency and human duties.  
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The lacuna in South African hate speech regulation was affirmed in Islamic Unity and will be 
analysed in detail in chapter 4. As a young democracy with growing instances of hate speech 
manifestations under the guise of free political expression, South Africa will need to seek 
guidance from international law and foreign comparatives in order to find an effective solution to 
the hate speech problem.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
COMPARATIVE LAW:   
International support for the limitation and criminalisation of hate speech 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Section 39 of the 1996 Constitution mandates the consideration of international law and suggests 
an analysis of foreign law when dealing with Bill of Rights interpretations. As South Africa has a 
relatively short constitutional tradition it is important to seek foreign law guidance on how to 
approach the limitation of a right from comparatives with a long-standing history of limitation of 
freedom of expression.
204
 
 
This chapter analyses the need for criminalisation of hate speech from an international law 
perspective. It examines the international perception of hate speech and ascertains whether 
limitation is internationally acceptable. It then investigates the international position on 
criminalisation at the hand of the various instruments selected for study. The distinction between 
the duty to prohibit and the duty to punish will be discussed, drawing guidance from various 
international law instruments. It answers the question whether it is possible to criminalise hate 
speech effectively. 
 
A comparative analysis of foreign constitutions focusing on Germany, Canada and the USA is 
undertaken to ascertain the position
 
of freedom of political expression and hate speech within the 
respective dispensations, utilising their constitutions and case law. Insight is gained into the 
respective legislatures‟ inclination towards the criminalisation of certain forms of speech by an 
investigation of legislation enacted in response to hate speech. The African position on hate 
speech is supported by an analysis of Namibia and Kenya and the shortcomings in their hate 
speech legislation as Africa‟s hate speech legislation in totality is young and developing.  
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Inferences are then drawn as to what might be an effective manner in which to criminalise hate 
speech in South Africa. 
  
3.2 Freedom of expression in international law 
 
The existence of the right to freedom of political expression within the international arena is 
indisputable. This section analyses relevant international instruments and then focuses on the 
instruments of Europe, America and Africa in order to gain insight as to the most effective 
manner in which to limit hate speech.  
 
3.2.1 Universal 
 
The right to freedom of expression is entrenched in the UDHR as an unqualified human right. 
There are no internal modifiers or demarcations that textually restrict this right. Limitation by 
law is allowed in terms of article 29(2) if it is to „secure due recognition and respect for the 
rights and freedoms of others‟.205 Morality, public order and the general societal welfare are 
listed as reasons for possible limitation. The UDHR does not define hate speech or other forms 
of negative speech, neither does it propose criminalisation but it allows for the limitation of all 
rights if this is in the interests of society at large. This provision indirectly implies a duty to 
prohibit negative speech.   
 
The ICCPR in article 19 grants every person the right to uphold opinions without interference.
206
 
Its construction confirms the definitional boundaries of freedom of expression in that it includes 
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written, oral, artistic or any other communication medium of choice, thereby extending the 
application beyond mere speech. Article 19(3) confirms the human duty as a result of the rights 
entitlement, thus allowing limitation through the duty that the right bearer incurs as a result of 
his interaction with other right bearers. The ICCPR clearly states that the right shall be limited 
only by necessary legal provisions.
207
 A number of instances that warrant the limitation of 
freedom of expression are identified in article 19 of the ICCPR as follows: Respect for the rights 
of others; protection of national security; protection of public order; protection of public health; 
and protection of the good morals of society.  
 
Article 20 further limits the right to freedom of expression by disallowing war propaganda and 
hate advocacy, incitement to discrimination and incitement to imminent violence.
208
 This 
correlates with the 1996 Constitution‟s codification of the right to freedom of expression in 
section 16(2). Article 19 guarantees freedom of expression and article 20(2) „imposes an 
obligation to restrict speech‟.209 When dealing with forms of expression that are possibly 
limitable, the question is whether limitation of freedom of expression is necessary based on the 
five instances that warrant limitation in terms of section 19 or whether it could be limited 
because it is classified as an article 20 form of expression that is not a guaranteed freedom. 
Article 19 refers to the human duty as discussed in chapter two by using the phrase „special 
duties and responsibilities‟. It states that the right to freedom of expression may only be limited 
„as provided by law‟.210 
 
In Robert Faurisson v France the Human Rights Commission (HRC) found that Faurisson‟s 
denial that gas chambers had been used during the Holocaust fell „precisely within the 
boundaries of article 20, paragraph 2‟.211 Even though it did not meet the strict criteria of 
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incitement it was held to fall within a category of hate speech which historically spread religious 
and racial hatred and amounts to hate advocacy.
212
 This very narrow interpretation is indicative 
of the international view that hate speech should be strictly dealt with and limited though the use 
of criminalising legislation.
213
 Hatred that is not coupled with incitement and elements of harm 
but is merely an emotional state is, however, regarded „simply an opinion and is thus absolutely 
protected under international law‟.214 International law consequently remains respectful of the 
right to freedom of expression but aware of the dangers of inciting hate speech.  
 
Care should be taken not be overzealous in legislation encroaching on the right to freedom of 
expression as a whole. France contended that in „order to avoid making it an offence to manifest 
an opinion ... the legislature chose to determine precisely the material element of the offence‟.215  
France only criminalised „the negation‟ or denial of Holocaust practices in order to protect the 
sanctity of freedom of expression.
216
   
 
Laws enacted should be in accordance with the requirements of article 20. Here a good example 
is to be found in the Canadian Criminal Code, which prohibits public and wilful incitement of 
hatred.
217
  In Malcolm Ross v Canada a Christian teacher‟s anti-Semitic publications (albeit 
outside his profession as a teacher) were found to be a violation of the rights of Jewish people 
and rights balancing gave the definitive answer.
218
 The Committee held that „freedom to 
manifest religious beliefs may be subject to limitations which are prescribed by law and are 
necessary to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of others‟.219 Rights balancing was 
affirmed as the best measure for limitation, coupled with legislation that clearly defines 
boundaries.      
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The construction of articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR leads to the question whether there is a 
difference between the sovereign state‟s duty to prohibit hate speech and its duty to punish hate 
speech. The duty to prohibit simply implies the limitation position; when political or other 
expression takes on the form of hate speech it should be limited to protect the rights of others, 
public order etc.
220
 
 
When a duty rests on a state to punish hate speech it implies the call for criminalisation, as is 
evident from article 2 of the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD)
221
 and article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).
222
  Criminalisation is implied because without clear 
direction on how to punish perpetrators the duty to punish might be breached or the boundaries 
of reasonable punishment overstepped.
223
 As the type of racial discriminations envisioned by 
ICERD are usually induced and spread through the expression of extreme emotions such as hate, 
a link is made between hate speech and racial discrimination.
224
 This applies equally to the 
gender discrimination defined in CEDAW, which correlates with section 16(2)(c), where 
„advocacy of hatred that is based on...gender‟ is left unprotected.225       
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ICERD imposes a duty on those sovereign states that choose to ratify the treaty to legislate 
against racial discrimination.
226
 ICERD and its provisions extend to hate speech falling within 
the ambit of section 16(2)(c) of the 1996 Constitution but only to „advocacy of hatred that is 
based on race [and] ethnicity‟.  South Africa as a signatory to ICERD is therefore obliged to use 
legislative measures to curb this form of discrimination (if other appropriate measures are not 
sufficient) and should restrict hate speech indirectly if and where manifestations of racial 
discrimination take the form of hate speech.
227
 The duty to prohibit hate speech is therefore less 
cumbersome than the duty to criminalise hate speech, as criminalisation is an extremely complex 
process. Prohibition can be brought about by less restrictive means such as the imposition of 
civil liabilities but the state‟s duty to punish is effected by a criminal sanction.228 A careful 
balance must be struck between punishment for deviant speech and limitation through 
criminalisation that exceeds the bounds of fairness.
229
    
 
Based on an analysis of these international instruments it is clear that both treaties and case law 
interpretation call for criminalisation of hate speech as a form of negative speech. An 
international duty therefore rests on state signatories to protect citizens against the negative 
effects of hate speech, using legislation where necessary.  
 
3.2.2 Europe 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) sets out the position regarding freedom of 
expression on the European continent.
230
  Article 10 is similar in construction to articles 19 and 
20 of the ICCPR but in addition it mentions that the guarantee of freedom of expression does not 
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detract from each sovereign government‟s choice as to whether licensing should be required for 
mass media communication.
231
 Again, this right is not left open and the duty it imposes on each 
right bearer is emphasised by highlighting a number of factors that may legitimately limit the 
right.
232
 Article 10(2) implies a need for criminalisation in its construction, making free speech 
„subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law‟.     
 
The German Basic Law follows a two-stage model of limitation in its section 5 construction of 
freedom of expression: 
 
(1) Everyone shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by speech, writing and 
pictures and freely to inform himself from generally accessible sources. Freedom of press and freedom of 
reporting by means of broadcasts and films are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. 
(2) These rights are limited by the provisions of the general laws, the provisions of law for the protection of 
youth, and by the right to inviolability of personal honour. 
(3) Art and science, research and teaching, shall be free. Freedom of teaching shall not absolve from loyalty 
to the constitution.
233
 
 
Section 5(1) correlates with section 16(1) of the 1996 Constitution as it constructs its definition 
of expression to include more than mere speech, extending it to written and pictorial 
representations. The inclusion of the phrase prohibiting censorship protects the importance of 
freedom of expression and is in line with Nelson‟s view that the „direct act of censorship by a 
government body in the form of prior restraint on publication‟ hinders the free availability of 
political facts.
234
 The inclusion of the prohibition against censorship affirms the importance of 
freedom of information and allowing unhindered political debate as it prohibits government from 
silencing its critics and opponents. In addition, it avoids the situation where a government can 
manipulate the information that is disseminated to its subjects.  
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Section 5(2) mentions „personal honour‟ as a right that could possibly trump freedom of 
expression along with the protection of the youth and general limiting legislation. Section 5(3) is 
again reminiscent of the 1996 Constitution in its reference to the spirit and purport of the Bill of 
Rights in making freedom of expression subject to loyalty to the German Basic Law. Section 
5(2) therefore emphasises the duty to protect against forms of expression that in essence violate 
the rights of others. Section 19 in its restriction of rights, acting as a general limitation clause, 
disallows arbitrary laws in section 19(1) and in section 19(2) it clarifies that „in no case may the 
essence of a basic right be affected‟  during limitation.   
  
In order to give adherence to section 5(2), sedition
235
 is criminalised under the German Criminal 
Code in section 130.
236
 Any form of publication of hatred against any members of a group of 
society or any incitement to imminent violence or incitement to defamation is disallowed even if 
perpetrated outside the German borders.
237
 The German crime of sedition places boundaries on 
freedom of expression by disallowing the disturbance of public peace and the incitement of 
hatred through violence or arbitrary measures directed against a specific racial, national or 
religious group.
238
  
 
In section 130(2) a fine or imprisonment for up to three years could follow if a person 
propagated hatred against the above mentioned groups or against an individual because of their 
membership of such a group. Section 130(4) imposes the same sanction on anyone who in public 
or in a meeting approves of, supports or glorifies National Socialist tyranny.  
 
The manner in which the German legislature criminalised sedition speaks of a strong cultural 
connection with the two World Wars and is evidently an attempt to proscribe forms of 
expression that could provoke a recurrence of these atrocities.
239
 There is an obvious connection 
between the crime of inciting National Socialist tyranny and Hitler‟s Nazi regime. The following 
guidelines for criminalising hate speech can be derived from section 130: 
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 Legislation should draw an obvious distinction between what is allowed and what is 
disallowed. 
 Legislation should define what constitutes hate speech within the specific cultural 
context. 
 Legislation can be geared towards prohibiting a recurrence of specific manifestations of 
hate speech which are likely to be linked to history and the nation‟s cultural connection. 
 Sanctions imposed should be unmistakably stipulated.  
 
Holocaust denial and apartheid practices regarding racial superiority share certain characteristics: 
Hate, perpetration of violence, inequality and the denial of dignity. Both represent known 
historical events with a hate speech connection that had detrimental historical consequences and 
a close cultural connection exists today in the current interpretation of forms of expression that 
are linked to these concepts. The German Basic Law‟s has a great reserve for personal honour 
and limits freedom of speech when faced with „internal enemies‟ that could destroy 
democracy.
240
 This is indicative of conservative liberalism, allowing for a more restrictive 
approach to negative forms of expression.
241
 The German position is similar to that of South 
Africa in that its cultural connection implies an emphasis on the right to dignity as a result of the 
historical denial of the right for certain marginalised groups.
242
 From the German construction it 
is clear that the duty to protect against hate speech cannot be separated from the duty to punish 
the perpetrators. There is limited sociological value in saying that people are not allowed to do 
something without saying what the consequences of the perpetration would be. 
 
In the Irving case the German Court displayed a conservative libertarian view on freedom of 
political expression.
243
 Holocaust denial as a form of freedom of political expression was 
disallowed and constitutional protection was not extended to this form of speech.
244
 The 
limitation was effected based on the premise that Holocaust denial equates to false facts and 
false facts are not protected speech in German law. 
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Mahoney is of the opinion that racially charged hate speech is „illegitimate speech and is 
properly subject‟ to legal restraints within the broader international community.245 Her 
libertarian predisposition supports the German view on legislating against certain forms of 
racial, ethnic or religious hate speech. Krotoszynski argues that it might be possible to endorse 
some form of hate speech regulation but on a miniscule scale.
246
 The German legislature has, 
however, affirmed Mahoney‟s libertarian position in the rigorous inroads it has made into 
political expression manifesting as hate speech by means of criminalising legislation. This 
legislation imposes a strict liability on the glorification of National Socialist tyranny which is 
directed at disturbing the public peace, inciting hatred, violence or arbitrary process and is 
expressed publically.
247
   
 
As a result of Germany‟s history the Federal Constitutional Court has reserved the right to 
prohibit certain activities of and expressions by political parties.
248
 As this gives the government 
power to regulate political opinion it opens the door for government to stifle the voice of the 
opposition. This is reiterated in Brugger‟s statement that the message of political speech could 
possibly cause it to fall within the ambit of hate speech.
249
 Legislation that uses hate speech as a 
scapegoat to silence political expression that runs counter to the current government‟s agenda is 
possibly the gravest danger identified in the criminalisation of hate speech. The German Federal 
Court has taken the stance that the self-initiated „communicative development‟ of the individual 
deserves protection but so, equally, does the audience facing the brunt of this „communicative 
development‟.250 The Federal Court therefore correctly uses the internationally supported 
approach of rights balancing when approaching hate speech limitation and interpretation of 
criminal sanctions. 
 
A possible reason for the strict legislative measures is the fact the German Basic Law was 
written as a temporary emergency measure to establish a functioning government after World 
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War II and has remained entrenched.
251
 What Krotoszynski terms the „militant democracy‟ 
which evolved out of and was very much influenced by its predecessor, the Nazi government, is 
another possible reason for the weak protection that freedom of political expression receives in 
Germany.
252
 Some argue that South Africa shares this trait. During the South African 
democratisation that followed the two-phase multiparty negotiation process and resulted in the 
1993 Constitution legislated by the government at that time, a little autocracy may have been 
transferred.
253
 Krotoszynski echoes the cultural connection in his statement that culture, history 
and the law can never be separated from each other as the one lives within and is born out of the 
other.
254
 Both South Africa and Germany have suffered heinous race/ethnic crimes in the past 
and in a reactive fashion there is an inclination to legislate strictly against conduct that simulates 
these past atrocities in order to ensure that they are not repeated.   
  
The „relational view‟255 of the German Court identifies three relationships which could stem 
from freedom of expression, namely reinforcement, opposition or indifference.
256
 Brugger is of 
the opinion that the importance given to the type of relationship is what will ultimately 
determine the significance attached to the speech and its content.
257
 Different forms of speech 
would therefore receive a „relational score‟ which would determine the protection afforded: 
 
When tensions or contradictions exist …. The speech in question may be less protected and considered to 
be “speech minus” or “low-value speech.” It is also possible that the expression in question will not even 
be considered speech in the constitutional sense at all. Legally speaking, such expressions would amount to 
“non-speech” unworthy of constitutional protection and easily restricted by government. An illustration of 
such non-speech is the Holocaust denial ….
258
 
  
The message of the German Court is therefore that what is termed value speech will be 
protected. If the speech does not have relational value, is false or has negative value, the German 
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Basic Law will not be as protective of it as it would be of speech with positive value. The test 
therefore seems to be one of societal worth.
259
 Within this contextual problem lies yet another 
distinction: Other forms of Holocaust speech which are used for political purposes or guilt denial 
do, however, receive some protection under section 5 of the German Basic Law, as these kinds 
of statement are not factual denials but forms of political expression.
260
   
 
The next question that arises from this analysis is whether complete freedom of political 
expression actually exists in Germany. At first glance the answer seems to be negative. Section 
86 and 86a of the German Criminal Code
261
  prohibits the display of the National Socialist 
symbols, in particular the swastika, and prohibits the production of such items; this is coupled 
with criminal sanctions should a contravention occur.
262
 The construction of section 86 and 86a 
is clearly retroactive against Nazism. If the criminalisation is viewed from a theoretical 
perspective it seems that free political expression is allowed as long as it is in line with the 
national government‟s ideology of democracy. If this criminalisation is viewed from the cultural 
connection perception, however, and seen in the light of a rights balancing perspective, the 
rationale behind the limitation of a particular failed kind of political expression appears to be 
reasonable and to be in line with conservative liberalism. 
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Stradella identifies the rights balancing process as the „contentious relationship‟ between hate 
speech and its discriminatory effect.
263
 Stradella proposes that the rights balancing process 
allows another form of discrimination to override the „negative discrimination‟ of hate speech, 
manifesting as discrimination against hate speech. By equating balancing with discrimination 
Stradella errs in interpretation and attempts to place speech beyond the reach of limitation in an 
absolutist manner. Internationally, the answer to the hate speech problem seems to be a call for 
punitive measures.
264
 Reasons for this pro-criminalisation approach include the protection of the 
democratic state, the „struggle against discrimination‟ and the need to defend the marginalised 
against the mobilising power of hate speech, which could ultimately result in heinous crimes 
such as genocide.
265
 Democracy in itself is built on the premise of competition and when a 
democracy transgresses the limits to protect itself against this very competition it becomes an 
autocracy rather than a democracy.266             
 
The hate speech versus political expression debate is part of this problem. What Stradella has 
done is to identify a weakness in the democratic model. Democracies which use limitations to 
impose repressive measures against the opposition indirectly become oppressors of speech and 
defy democracy.
267
 If criminalisation of hate speech is for the protection of the individual whose 
dignity and equality have been scarred then theoretically limitation would be the ideal position. 
If, however, criminalisation is used to silence the opposition as a mechanism to preserve the 
current government‟s rule, within the democratic ideal, this would be morally reprehensible.  
 
I propose that criminalisation as a means to achieve rights balancing is the most effective 
manner to adhere to the international state duty to protect against hate speech and the duty to 
punish its perpetrators. In line with the German libertarian view, which purports limitation when 
speech has negative value, in order to preserve democracy and social cohesion it remains 
imperative to protect the substance of freedom of expression as a conduit of democracy while at 
the same time remembering the democratic goals of equality, dignity and freedom.  
3.2.3 The Americas  
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The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (ADRDM)
268
 is a reflection of the 
US Constitution in its simple, open-ended construction of the right to freedom of expression.
269
 
In article 13 the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),
270
 promulgated after the 
ADRDM in 1969, again confirms the importance of the right to freedom of both thought and 
expression.
271
 Rights limitations for the purpose of national order, health and morality, along 
with respect for dignity, are allowed in terms of section 13(2)(b) and 13(2)(a). Prior censorship 
is barred but the possibility of incurring civil liability as a result of the infringement of the rights 
of others is left open for decision by the courts and the legislature. The instances that warrant 
limitation of the right are a mirror image of those listed in the ICCPR. 
 
Section 13(5) goes beyond imposing a civil liability by further limiting hate speech by 
criminalising it as follows: 
 
Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitement 
to lawless violence or to any other similar illegal action against any person or group of persons on any 
grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses 
punishable by law.  
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The international call for the criminalisation of hate speech that incites violence and other crimes 
is again affirmed. For a hate speech crime to exist there needs to be causality between the 
incitement and the resulting harm. Section 13(3) specifically protects the right from 
governmental abuse and indirect silencing of the opposition through the use of mechanisms such 
as media censorship. 
 
Section 2(2)(b) of the Canadian Charter represents a two-stage model of limitation and 
guarantees the right to freedom expression as follows: 
 
[F]reedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of 
communication;
272
 
 
The Criminal Code
273
 and the Human Rights Act
274
 impose limitations on freedom of expression 
in terms of section 13(5) of the ACHR. Section 13 of the Human Rights Act restricts the use of 
telecommunication facilities to promote hate speech, for example through a website.
275
 Such 
communication must promote hatred/contempt and must be regarded as discriminatory on the 
basis of one of the prohibited grounds in order to qualify as a discriminatory practice which leads 
to grave psychological anguish.
276
 Section 13(2) does not extend the crime to broadcasting 
undertakings such as news stations, thereby protecting the freedom of the press. This Act does 
not mention incitement to violence or imminence, which means that, for example, a repeated 
web broadcast advocating discrimination based on race could satisfy the requirements of the 
Human Rights Act. This identifies a narrow construction of hate speech legislation in Canada 
within its libertarian view. Communication that does not serve a „social purpose‟ in a democratic 
state is regarded as limitable, which mirrors Germany‟s value speech approach.277   
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In Canadian Human Rights Commission v Taylor the Supreme Court held that section 13(1) „was 
a reasonable limit on freedom of expression justified in a free and democratic society and did not 
violate the Charter‟.278 As hate speech was found to undermine the dignity of an identifiable 
group and „contribute to disharmonious relations among various racial, cultural and religious 
groups‟, in a manner which is not socially cohesive, destroys the fabric of a society and goes 
against equality, section 13(1) was considered to be a reasonable limitation in terms of the rights 
balancing approach followed by the Supreme Court. The use of the word „repeated‟, which 
suggests extreme action and the fact that it implies the communication of severe hatred saved 
section 13 from being declared unconstitutional.   
 
Section 319 of the Criminal Code proscribes statements that disturb the public peace, incite 
hatred and are likely to breach the public peace.
279
 The punishment stipulated is imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding two years. Five elements must be present for conviction of the 
crime:
280
 
 Statements must be communicated expressly.   
 Statements must be communicated in a public place.  
 Statements must incite hatred against an identifiable group. 
 Statements must be directed against an identifiable group.  
 Statements made must be in such a way that they are likely to breach the peace.
281
  
The landmark decision is that of R v Keegstra which confirms advocacy of hatred against a 
minority group as a criminal offence.
282
 In this case a teacher who taught Holocaust denial and 
advocated anti-Semitic ideas and hatred towards Jewish people was brought to justice. Dickson 
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CJ identified rights balancing as the most correct approach to the limiting of rights in his 
statement:  
 
The large and liberal interpretation given to freedom of expression indicates that the preferable course is to 
weigh the various contextual values and factors in s. 1 of the Charter. This section both guarantees and 
limits Charter rights and freedoms by reference to principles fundamental in a free and democratic 
society.
283
 
 
It was held that section 319(2) represents a reasonable limit on freedom of expression, relying on 
the harm principle, as the harm caused by hate speech is seen as a sufficiently important reason 
for limitation.
284
 The section was reviewed for encroachment on the spirit of freedom of 
expression and it was held that it „does not suffer from overbreadth or vagueness‟ as the clear 
definitional limits protects all forms of expression save for those that are „openly hostile‟ and 
delimited in the Act.
285
 As the limitation is directed only at the „harm at which the prohibition is 
targeted‟ it is clear that the legislation does only what is intended and is within the spirit of 
section 13(2) of the ACHR.
286
 The Canadian cultural connection received prominence with 
Dickson CJ identifying it as the „quest for truth, the promotion of individual self-development or 
the protection and fostering of a vibrant democracy‟ where complete public participation is 
supported.
287
 Hate propaganda was deemed to detract rather than add to these aspirations and 
limitation in favour of other rights was therefore deemed appropriate and necessary.  
 
The following guidelines for effective criminalisation are therefore identified in the Canadian 
context: 
 Clearly defined boundaries of the hate speech offence to avoid vagueness. 
 Clearly identified and specifically listed forms of expression that are deemed 
perpetrations in order to avoid „overbreadth‟ in legislation. 
 Clearly defined punishment for the hate speech offence. 
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 Internal limits on the hate speech offence to protect the democratic ideal.288 
 
The absolutist position of the USA is very different from the Canadian libertarian view. The US 
government is strictly prohibited from legislating against free speech and censorship of content is 
frowned upon.
289
 This absolutist approach has prohibited the government from restricting hate 
speech and limitation is effected through common law principles such as the „fighting words‟ 
doctrine which was utilised to limit freedom of political expression in Brandenburg
290
 and 
Yates.
291
 This implies that the USA does not adhere to section 13(5) of the ACHR since it refuses 
to legislate against hate speech as the USA does not consider hate speech to be an „offence 
punishable by law‟.  
 
Some weak forms of legislation do exist, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
292
 which 
incorporates the principle of vicarious liability for employers who allow hate speech by their 
employees if it contributes to harassment in a broad sense which creates antagonistic, 
intimidating and distasteful working environments.
293
 Private universities tried to soften the hate 
speech blow by institutionalising codes or rules against discrimination on listed grounds.
294
 The 
US courts have not embraced such measures, identifying them as counter-freedom in UWM 
Post.
295
 The US absolutist predisposition protects free speech up and to the last possible point 
where the hate incitement is transformed into constructive action. This is in line with the possibly 
skewed perception that self-actualisation is ultimately achieved through expression.
296
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289
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The US absolutist predisposition is analysed at the hand of case law as legislation is limited and 
made extremely cumbersome by the First Amendment.
297
 This highlights an inherent tension 
with the Fourteenth Amendment as it receives unequal treatment as a right superior to other 
rights.
298
 Heyman defines hate speech as „expression that abuses or degrades others on account 
of their racial, ethnic, or religious identity‟.299 He identifies three approaches to the right to 
freedom of expression within the scope of the First Amendment: The static position, the civil-
libertarian position and the rights balance position.
300
 Because of the prohibition against defining 
the boundaries around freedom of political expression and hate speech, a possible fourth 
category of formalistic absolutism is identified.
301
 Formalistic absolutism and the static position 
should be guarded against and are deemed counter-productive in the sense that they could 
illegitimately encroach on the rights of others, thereby undermining the normative nature of 
freedom of expression as a right. Such an interpretation could ultimately lead to erosion of public 
acceptance of the right.302 The rights balancing approach is therefore identified as the optimum 
position between the two extremes of staticism and civil-libertarianism.
303
   
 
Initially the US courts approached freedom of expression in a civil-libertarian fashion, as is 
evident from Beauharnais v Illinois where the court found that Beauharnais‟s call on a million 
whites to unite against Negro invasion was in fact group libel.
304
 Limitation was allowed in order 
to protect public order, in recognition of the fact that in certain circumstances it may be 
necessary to limit freedom of expression to preserve social cohesion. The US courts have moved 
gradually from civil-libertarianism towards the static position with the verdict in Brandenburg v 
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Ohio
305
 where the court limited the „fighting words‟ doctrine severely by reversing the guilty 
verdict against a cross-burning Klansman who made hateful threats towards those who suppress 
white supremacy.
306
   
 
The US court‟s decisions became more liberal until the absolutist approach became embedded in 
Collin v Smith.
307
 The High Court nullified ordinances that prohibited the Ku Klux Klan from 
marching and expressing their views in Skokie, a town that housed numerous Holocaust 
survivors. This indicated a decisive move towards absolutism.
308
 The victims were ignored and 
stripped of their dignity for the sake of the perpetrators‟ sublime right to free speech. This 
highlights some of the risks, namely rights affronts, physiological trauma and 
disenfranchisement of the audience among others, embedded in an absolutist orientation.
309
 The 
perpetrator‟s rights argument developed on the basis of this decision.310  Supporters of this 
argument are of the opinion that, in the interests of democracy, freedom of political expression 
should be protected above and beyond the listener‟s pain and free speech deserves the highest 
audience.
311
 Unlike the USA, which explicitly favours the speaker, the Canadian, German and 
South African dispensations try to strike the important balance between the speaker and the 
audience. Within this obscure reality of rights hierarchy formation it remains contentious 
whether true freedom exists for the full spectrum of human rights.  
 
A refreshing break in the static trend came in Contreras v Crown Zellerbach where rights 
balancing was utilised in a case dealing with the tort of outrage.
312
 The High Court held that a 
Mexican American employee‟s claim against his employer as a result of racial insulting and 
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embarrassing words was successful.
313
 The Court held that „racial epithets which were once part 
of common usage‟ may now not simply be viewed as merely insulting and that the deeper 
emotional meaning along with the effect thereof should be considered.
314
 The dignity right of the 
employee was balanced against the freedom of expression right of the employer and more weight 
afforded to dignity than to hurtful freedom of expression.  
 
In Texas v Johnson the Supreme Court affirmed the static position and ventured to allow that 
which was unthinkable at that historical point, namely flag burning and disdain for the patriotic 
American symbol.
315
 In R.A.V. v City of St. Paul the Supreme Court tore down the barriers 
against hate speech on university and college campuses.
316
 The importance of the finding lies in 
the fact that the Supreme Court now found the idea of „political correctness‟ absurd and allowed 
for the free and open display of racially charged and offensive symbolism as an aid to the liberal 
democratic process.
317
   
 
From the analysis in chapter 2 and the case law studied, the following defences for absolutism 
have been identified:     
 Self–actualisation is achieved through the ability to express oneself fully.318   
 Absolute freedom of speech and the free „marketplace of ideas‟ must be upheld to 
preserve democracy.
319
 
 The search for truth can only be successful if through unlimited expression.320  
The true value of unrestricted speech is questionable and the defences for absolutism are 
contradictory in themselves.
321
 I propose that self-actualisation is achieved through the 
                                                 
313
 Delgado & Stefanic Must We Defend Nazis? (1997) 3. 
314
 Contreras n 312 at 741, 565 and 1174. This interpretation is mirrored in the South African case Polakow v Radio 
Islam n 455 where the effect of racially charged hate speech was interpreted as causing psychological harm which 
cannot be ignored by the judiciary.  
315
 Texas v Johnson 491 US (1989). 
316
 R.A.V v City of St. Paul 505 US 377 (1992). 
317
 Baez n 310 37. 
318
 Gates et al Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex:  Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties (1993) 86. 
319
 Milton n 65. 
320
 Nelson n 24 3. 
321
 I criticise the above-mentioned defences for absolute free speech as follows: 
 If absolute free speech is allowed and the notion of group cohesion and society is completely ignored the 
supporters of this view run the risk of societal demise where a society can start turning on itself in the 
absence of, albeit limited, regulation of speech; 
65 
 
enjoyment of the full spectrum of human rights. Freedom of political expression is imperative 
but Owen‟s statement that this freedom should be defended „on a matter of principle because it is 
what makes people feel their lives matter‟ cannot be unreservedly supported.322 The negative 
effects that hate speech has on the society, which the democratic ideal proposes to protect, 
cannot be ignored by oversimplifying a static position of non-limitation as supreme. The 
audience‟s rights cannot be ignored and the numerous checks and balances built into the 
democratic system should be viewed in combination in order to govern truly democratically and 
respect the rights of all citizens in a balanced manner. 
 
The following guidelines for criminalising legislation have been derived from the analysis of 
practices in the USA: 
 Legislation should identify groups that are subject to discrimination and qualify for 
protection (i.e. listed grounds). 
 Legislation should clearly stipulate the grounds for limitation. 
 The construction of the legislative measures must be protective in nature. 
 The construction must take cognisance of rights balancing. 
 The protection must apply generally to the group against which hate speech is directed 
and not only to specific individuals. 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
 Self-actualisation is a complex process and by identifying expression as the definitive element in achieving 
this ideal one is ignoring a the full spectrum of values, activities and processes involved in achieving this 
state of mind which is best explored through research done in the fields of psychology and sociology. See  
n 64 and n 296 for a detailed explanation of Maslow‟s hierarchy of needs. 
 By transferring concepts from one academic field to another without fully comprehending all the elements 
of the doctrine one runs the risk of corrupting an ideal. At this point it is imperative to analyse the origin of 
the „marketplace of ideas‟. The „marketplace of ideas‟ stems from Adam Smith‟s concept of the wealth of 
nations which presupposes a free trading community to be the most effective for economic advance. The 
free market system does not force anyone to buy the products offered; it merely removes restraints to trade 
should the participants wish to voluntarily trade with one another. Within the legal field this reality is not 
reflected: The free „marketplace of ideas‟ forces people to hear messages that they would not have wanted 
to, had the choice been theirs. In an economic free market, if there is a supply of apples without a 
correlative demand, no transaction would take place. In the „marketplace of ideas‟, the buyer‟s choice has 
been eradicated by the undue absolutist protection placed on the supply of ideas. The audience 
(representing the buyer) does not have a choice whether to hear the message as the buyer would have in a 
free market.  
 Equating hate speech with truth is ill-defined. Hate is a strong emotion which often makes clear thinking 
and ultimate truth discovery impossible. 
322
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3.2.4 Africa 
 
Except for the ADRDM, all the international human rights instruments studied so far have 
internally modified or demarcated the right to freedom of expression. Internationally, the right to 
freedom of expression is therefore regarded as limitable and not absolute. The Banjul Charter on 
Human and Peoples‟ Rights (Banjul Charter) touches on the right to freedom of expression, 
albeit briefly.
323
 Article 9(1) grants everyone the right to receive information. Article 9(2) 
ensures that all individuals must be allowed the opportunity to express and disseminate their 
opinions, subject to local legislation. From the outset article 9(2) therefore recognises that 
speech is limitable and there is a need for legislation which regulates negative forms of speech. 
The Bangul Charter therefore does not call for the criminalisation of hate speech but recognises 
the possible need for limitation.       
 
When comparing this charter with other international instruments the question that comes to 
mind is; why is there so little attention to the limitation of freedom of expression in the Banjul 
Charter, which has a communal rather than an individualistic orientation? A possible answer to 
this question can be found in article 27(2) of the Banjul Charter, which provides that all rights 
and freedoms are only to be exercised with due regard to the „rights of others, collective security, 
morality and common interest‟. This article serves as a general limitation clause embedded 
within the Banjul Charter against which all actions must be measured.
324
 Freedom of political 
expression and hate speech would therefore have to withstand the article 27 test, which would 
curb hate speech as it is possibly a violation of communal interest, could be regarded as 
immoral, possibly threatens collective security and could ultimately be an infringement of the 
audience‟s rights to dignity and equality. 
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The next probable reason is found in the article 29 duty clause.
325
 Article 29(3) imposes a duty 
on each individual not to compromise state security. Article 29(4) stipulates that each individual 
should conserve and reinforce national harmony and section 29(7) imposes the duty on each 
individual to protect and support African cultural values in his or her interaction with others, 
which implies a spirit of tolerance. In general the duty clause requires of an individual to 
contribute to the promotion of the moral well being of society. Hate speech practices are contra 
the spirit and purport of the duty clause as they often compromise state security, separate 
minorities rather than preserving solidarity and add no value to societal moral well-being.  
 
The protocol to the Banjul Charter established an African Court on Human and Peoples‟ Rights 
(ACHPR) in 2004.
326
 To date it has not yet ruled on hate speech and Wachira is of the opinion 
that the delay in justice as a result of the lengthy period it has taken to establish the court, could 
ultimately equate to the denial of justice.
327
 The difficulties surrounding the establishing of a 
functioning court have not gone unnoticed and progress has been made in identifying the 
location of a court seat, drawing up procedural rules and appointing judges, with some cases 
heard.
328
 It is possible but far from optimum to turn to other international tribunals which are not 
necessarily uniquely African, to gain insight into hate speech limitation from an African 
perspective.   
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)
329
 has jurisdiction to try international 
crimes such as genocide and incitement to genocide.
330
 Incitement to genocide includes all the 
elements of hate speech but requires an exponential furthering of the hate incitement into actions 
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with large-scale repercussions. In The Prosecutor v. Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza and Hassan Ngeze
331
 documents which were filled with ethnic hatred and 
incitement to violence against Tutsis were found to have been produced with the intent to 
destroy an entire ethnic group.
332
 A distinction was drawn between mere ethnocentric 
discussions and the wilful, active promotion of ethnic hatred.
333
 The element of discussion is not 
what attracted a guilty verdict but rather the incitement to action.  It could be deduced that if the 
discussion phase is not deemed limitable under genocide crimes, the same should apply to hate 
speech and as a result hate discussions without incitement should be treated as pure freedom of 
expression and not limited at all. This identifies the grave risk of escalation embedded in hate 
speech which is often the antecedent to genocide. Hate speech which incites harm should be 
regulated in order to prohibit intensification into widespread atrocities with dire consequences. 
The African community awaits the ACHPR‟s active functioning before purely African insight 
into the limitation of hate speech and possible need for criminalisation will be possible. 
 
African comparatives that have recently attempted to criminalise hate speech and share South 
Africa‟s libertarian view on freedom of speech are Namibia and Kenya. Namibia failed partially 
in its attempt to criminalise hate speech in the Racial Discrimination Prohibition Act section 
11,
334
 with the High Court making a finding in Namibia v Ester Smith and Others that the 
inclusion of „any act or thing‟ and „racial group‟ was overly broad.335 It was held that 
disharmony and feelings of hostility are not always extreme emotions and are quite often 
encountered on a daily basis.
336
 The legislature‟s failure to clearly define the hate speech 
element is what ultimately resulted in the legislation not meeting the constitutional requirements 
set out in section 21.
337
   
 
In 2007 Kenya saw 1,300 people killed as a result of hate speech messages broadcast on radio in 
local languages which once again affirmed the dire risk embedded within hate speech and the 
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need for regulating hate speech stringently.
338
 In section 96 the Kenyan Penal Code prohibits 
words that incite actions causing death/injury, damage to property or violence. Section 96 of the 
Kenyan Penal Code equates to the section 16(2)(b) modification of the 1996 Constitution: 
Incitement to imminent violence.
339
 Kenya‟s criminalisation of hate speech has been somewhat 
effective but not without criticism. Section 13 of the National Cohesion and Integration Act 
criminalises hate speech directed against ethnic groups which requires the following for a 
positive finding of hate speech: Public advocacy of ethnic hatred, in conjunction with intent and 
concurrent incitement. No requirement of imminence/likely action has been written into the 
text.
340
  I am of the opinion that this construction is correct and that it is also reflected in section 
16(2)(c) of the 1996 Constitution. Imminent action should not be a requirement for hate speech 
however incitement to harm, albeit psychological or physical, is required. 
 
Kenya has made great progress in regulating hate speech since its first referendum on the matter 
held in 2005. The Draft Prohibition of Hate Speech and Incitement to Hatred Bill (DHSIH) 
identifies the continued support for curbing hate speech as a form of negative and destructive 
speech. The DHSIH is criticised by Article 19, an international institution defending freedom of 
expression and information, as an Act with sanctions disproportionate to the crime, an unclear 
objective and unsure procedural safeguards.
341
 The National Cohesion and Integration Act 
prohibits hate speech against ethnic groups but other forms of hate speech, for example gender 
based hate speech, is still left unregulated. The DHSIH clearly encroaches on freedom of 
expression, extending beyond hate speech.  There is a lack of clarity in definitions and the 
purposes of the safeguards are ambiguous which possibly makes it inoperable. It ignores the 
international requirement for striking the balance between freedom of speech and hate speech 
limitations.  
 
                                                 
338
 Pflanz http://www.csmonitor.com/World/ Africa/2010/0618/Kenya-reins-in-hate-speech-ahead-of-constitution-
vote (Date of use 13/09/2011). 
339
 The Kenya Penal Code 1970. Section 96 correlates to the protection offered in the Riotous Assemblies Act.  
340
 National Cohesion and Integration Act 4 of 2008.  The legislature included written materials, artistic displays and 
elements of press releases (forms of expression that are often exempt from hate speech). This is clearly a response to 
prevent the reoccurrence of the 2007 atrocities and is in terms of Kenya‟s cultural connection. 
341
 Article 19 www.article19.org/pdfs/press/kenya-article-19-recommends-amendments-to-hate- speech (Date of use 
15/05/201) 1 and Mbaaro http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1796018 (Date of Use 9/10/2011) 52. 
70 
 
Article 19 criticises African hate speech legislation as „patchwork‟ legislation which varies 
greatly between different countries, is inherently inconsistent and is vague.
342
 What becomes 
evident from the African analysis is that there is still a long walk towards effective hate speech 
legislation. The South African analysis will follow in chapter 4.  
 
3.3 Conclusion 
 
An analysis of international instruments identifies a clear call for the criminalisation of hate 
speech, with the exception of the ADRDM and the Banjul Charter which merely acknowledges 
limitation through legislation. Africa‟s short history with its independent rights instruments and 
its duty-oriented approach to human rights, have been identified as possible reasons for this 
exception. The duty to prohibit hate speech and the duty to punish offences cannot be severed as 
very little can be achieved by unenforceable rules. 
 
The following framework for effective hate speech criminalising legislation is proposed on the 
basis of the international analysis in this chapter: The law must be practicable and enforceable 
and must clearly define what is allowed and what is prohibited. The law must include a 
definition of hate speech, drawn from the specific nation‟s cultural tradition. The elements of the 
crime must be outlined and the following framework is suggested: The statements must be made 
publicly; with intent; must be directed towards a defined group and must inspire violence, harm 
or an imminent breach of the peace. In addition, the boundaries of hate speech must be clearly 
defined to avoid uncertainty and vagueness. Specific forms of hate speech can be listed to 
provide clarity. Defences must be stipulated unambiguously and the legislation must be drafted 
specifically and not broadly to act as a catch-all mechanism, as this will encroach on the spirit of 
the right to freedom of expression. The legislation should identify rights balancing as the 
optimum approach to managing hate speech. The legislation should be internally demarcated to 
ensure the protection of democracy, the marginalised and those in a weak bargaining position. 
Lastly, the legislation should be drafted so as to protect both the rights of the speaker and the 
rights of the audience. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN LAW AND CASE LAW PRECEDENT ON HATE 
SPEECH:   
Affirming a lacuna in hate speech regulation 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter delves into current South African common law remedies and legislation that protect 
against the effects of hate speech in order to affirm the lacuna left by the modification of section 
16(2) of the 1996 Constitution. It investigates current legislation governing hate speech and the 
need for the possible furtherance of the limitation of freedom of expression in order to answer 
the international call for criminalisation of hate speech.  
 
The South African cultural connection and the judiciary‟s view on hate speech limitation will be 
ascertained. The case law study assesses the need for furtherance of limitation of hate speech 
within a libertarian dispensation and investigates the risks of limitation encroaching on freedom 
of expression.  
 
The fact that the general limitation clause in section 36 of the 1996 Constitution does not apply 
to hate speech, as discussed in chapter 2, and the risk that limitation that does not have to 
withstand this test could encroach on the section 16(1) protection of freedom of expression, will 
be addressed.   
 
The chapter concludes by suggesting the most effective manner for South Africa to limit hate 
speech and its negative effects. 
 
4.2 Unprotected speech: A need for further limitation through legislation? 
 
The apartheid government notoriously introduced criminal sanctions for matters involving 
governmental opposition, resulting in a history of legislation that oppressed free speech in order 
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to achieve governmental agendas.
343
  Legislation on matters of expression remains at the 
discretion of each sovereign state and at the same time the risk of bias and manipulation remains 
evident. It is the duty of each state to take great care to preserve the democratic ideals in 
legislation that curbs absolute free speech.
344
       
 
The international call for criminalisation with South Africa as the signatory to both ICERD and 
CEDAW further highlights the need for criminalisation of hate speech.  This call, along with an 
increase in litigation, ineffective measures of redress and modifications to the core right to 
freedom of expression, is indicative of a lacuna in the law. However, before a lacuna can be 
established common law remedies and current legislative measures need to be analysed to 
ascertain whether they protect effectively and sufficiently against the negative effects of hate 
speech.      
 
Each country‟s cultural connection is definitive in their predisposition to legislate on 
fundamental rights issues. The South African legislature has taken a seemingly pro-legislation 
approach by drafting the DHSB
345
 and promulgating PEPUDA. Haigh is of the opinion that this 
legislative approach is ineffective and unable to fulfil that objective.
346
  He states that „the right 
to dignity [is] best preserved by eliminating such legislation‟ and turning to the constitutional 
provisions to protect and preserve. 
 
Within a libertarian view of freedom of expression Haigh‟s opinion should be analysed in terms 
of remedies found in the common law and current legislation. PEPUDA has been offering civil 
redress, in addition to common law remedies, since 2000. As far as the criminal element goes, if 
the common law remedies are sufficient to safeguard the interests of those affected by hate 
speech it would eliminate the need for criminal legislation. A variety of defences against „speech 
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that hurts‟ can be found in common law remedies that include crimen iniuria,347 criminal 
defamation
348
 and a delict of injury to another‟s dignity (injuria),349 of which the first two 
represent criminal sanctions and the latter a form of civil redress. The act of incitement is 
regulated and criminalised by legislation and hate speech manifestations that fall within its ambit 
are indirectly criminalised.
350
 
 
The Riotous Assemblies Act criminalises incitement and defines it in the following terms: 
 
18(2) Any person who… incites, instigates, commands or procures any other person to commit any 
offence, whether at common law or against a statute or statutory regulation, shall be guilty of an offence 
and liable on conviction to the punishment to which a person convicted of actually committing that offence 
would be liable.
 351
 
 
This seeks to prohibit anyone from instigating others to commit crimes on his or her behalf.
352
  
Under the Riotous Assemblies Act, if speech provokes people to commit offences like malicious 
injury to property or assault, the perpetrators of the actual acts would be guilty of a crime and the 
speakers/instigators could be liable and incur the same penalty as those who physically 
committed the criminal action. This form of redress ignores the psychological harm in hate 
speech and cannot be transferred to 16(2)(c) as its formulation does not specifically require 
physical acts or violence but merely incitement to cause harm.  The Riotous Assemblies Act 
addresses the section 16(2)(b) exclusion of incitement to imminent violence.     
 
Crimen iniuria is defined as „unlawful, intentional and serious violation of the dignity or privacy 
of another‟.353  Originally crimen iniuria, which entered the South African law as a defence in 
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1908 in the case of Umfaan,
354
 included serious, unlawful, intentional infringements of 
dignitas,
355
 fama
356
 and corpus.
357
   
 
When the definition of crimen iniuria is applied to hate speech in the South African context the 
discrepancy soon becomes clear. Depending on the facts and circumstances, it could be 
straightforward to prove that hate speech is intentional and violates the dignity rights of another. 
When dealing with unlawfulness the matter becomes more complex. An act is unlawful if there 
are no grounds of justification for the act
358
 and it is a violation of a statute, constitution or legal 
precedent.
359
  As there is currently no statute that criminalises hate speech in South Africa and it 
was not constitutionally criminalised either, there can be no violation of statute or constitution. 
As South Africa‟s history and legislative precedent dealing with hate speech are relatively young 
and are still developing, the last ground, namely violation of legal precedent, is also unlikely. 
Hate speech is unlikely to infringe fama as it is usually geared towards a group and not an 
individual‟s reputation. Furthermore, section 16(2)(c) does not need a corpus violation to be 
present to suffice as hate speech because psychological harm is sufficient.  
 
The application of crimen iniuria to hate speech now becomes less likely and the fact that South 
African case law on hate speech seldom if ever turns to crimen iniuria as a form of redress is 
indicative of the difficulty in its application.
360
  This strengthens the lacuna argument in favour 
of criminalisation. 
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Criminal defamation is defined as „unlawful and intentional publication of matter concerning 
another which tends seriously to injure his reputation‟.361 Forms of hate speech such as express 
racism could fall within the definition of this crime.
362
 The analysis of South African case law on 
hate speech which follows indicates that the state does not prosecute on behalf of the injured in 
terms of this common law form of redress. If the hate speech consists of unlawful expressions, 
made publicly, with intent and likely to seriously injure the victim‟s reputation it could meet the 
definitional elements of criminal defamation (discussion on crimen iniuria applies equally). 
Reputation is defined as a person‟s honour, community standing or good name.363 Defamation of 
the good name is ordinarily in the form of untruths about the specific person. It is unlikely that 
broad-based hate speech, such as anti-Semitic statements about Jewish people in general, will 
suffice this criterion.   
 
Lastly, a delict of criminal defamation or injuria could be utilised to protect the injured audience 
against hate speech.
364
 Because the burden of proof for civil liability is only a balance of 
probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt as it is for crimes, it would be easier to prove „the 
subjective feelings of an individual have been wounded‟.365  In addition to the five elements that 
need to be sufficed for any delict, there must be a suspicion of animus iniuriandi and both the 
subjective and the objective test for injury would have to be met.
366
 The high cost of litigation 
and the administrative burden placed on individuals who avert themselves to this form of redress 
often makes it impracticable. It is furthermore individually focused and has a marginal deterrent 
effect.  
  
To suffice the requirements of the delict, the hate speech would have to be insulting and be 
coupled with degrading words.
367
 Hate speech will therefore more easily meet the criteria of the 
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delict of injuria. The common law therefore extends aid to the hate speech audience in the form 
of civil redress. The protection afforded in PEPUDA is similar and the lacuna in hate speech 
prohibition remains. The fact that the delict of injuria will apply to hate speech in an over-
arching manner does not negate the need for criminalising legislation, which is necessary for a 
young democracy in need of guidance on managing sensitive issues such as hate speech.  
 
In Strydom v Chiloane
368
 the High Court acknowledged the importance and applicability of the 
common law remedies as forms of redress, stating that that there is „no bar against the 
respondent instituting action against the appellant for redress based on a claim of injuria‟.369  The 
High Court held that calling a person a „baboon‟ suffices the hurtful requirement of section 10 of 
PEPUDA, which equates to the use of the common law remedy of injuria.
370
 The fact that two 
remedies (legislative and common law) offer the same theoretical results affirms the current gap 
in hate speech regulation and the need for criminalisation. 
 
The high cost of litigation, delays in process and clear definitions minimising interpretive bias 
are some of the factors that would promote the use of legislation as opposed to having recourse 
to common law forms of redress.
371
 The presumption that process is easier when clearly defined 
legislation is in place is debatable and it is held that common law remedies are possibly as 
effective as legislation. The same delays that might occur when using common law remedies can 
occur with legislation. The argument that clear definitions minimise interpretation bias is correct. 
Developing a precedent without clear guidelines can be cumbersome, lead to error and 
significantly expand the scope of the law if foreign law has to be used to find precedent.           
 
The following reasons affirming the lacuna in the South African law regarding hate speech have 
been identified:  Firstly, the common law remedies are not specifically tailored for use in hate 
speech litigation and general in nature. This makes application in hate speech cases very 
burdensome and time consuming. Secondly, the increasing occurrences of hate speech litigation 
are an indication of the importance of the right to freedom of expression but also of the injurious 
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effect of hate speech, for which the nation is seeking redress.
372
 In the third place, South African 
society views hate speech as something negative and counter-democratic. The fourth reason is 
that the common law delict of injuria overlaps with PEPUDA and such private litigation comes 
at a high cost, which could cause justice to be delayed or totally denied.
373
  In the fifth place, 
South Africa is a young developing democracy in need of guidance on how to protect its subjects 
from the injurious effect of hate speech.
374
 A sixth reason affirming the lacuna is the tabling of 
the DHSB, which indicates that the legislature regards hate speech as a crime and that it has been 
identified and placed on the legislature‟s agenda as a subject in need of addressing. A seventh 
reason is the section 16(2) modification affirming that the constitutional drafters have identified 
hate speech as limitable beyond section 36. Lastly, the lacuna is affirmed by the international 
call for criminalisation which was discussed in detail in chapter 3.  
 
4.3 Current South African legislation on hate speech 
 
The criminalisation question is very delicate as a sensitive balance must be struck between 
defending freedoms and fundamental rights promoting the spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights 
on the one hand and protecting against injustice on the other. The analysis in chapter 2 affirmed 
that hate speech, as a form of unprotected speech, is not afforded the umbrella protection of the 
section 36 general limitation clause.  Limitation through legislation against hate speech in its 
pure form would therefore not be subject to the justifiable limitation test. When legislation 
prohibiting hate speech is overly broad and unduly restrictive there is a risk that the legislation 
could be declared unconstitutional in terms of section 36. Such legislation could encroach upon 
the section 16(1) forms of protected speech, which automatically re-enters it into the list of 
categories that are subject to the general limitation clause. The ideological aspiration within hate 
speech prohibition, which is to eliminate discrimination while protecting dignity and equality by 
guarding against the negative effects of hate speech, always bears the risk that certain democratic 
freedoms might have to be sacrificed.
375
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4.3.1 PEPUDA     
 
In 2000 PEPUDA was enacted to give effect to section 9 of the 1996 Constitution. Its preamble 
states the following: 
 
This Act endeavours to facilitate the transition to a democratic society, united in its diversity, marked by 
human relations that are caring and compassionate, and guided by the principles of equality, fairness, 
equity, social progress, justice, human dignity and freedom. 
 
It also acknowledged its duty to promote equality under both ICERD and CEDAW, which are 
„binding treaties and customary international law‟.376  The definitions found in section 1 do not 
define hate speech per se but the objects of the Act include the prohibition of hate speech as 
contemplated in section 16(2)(c) of the 1996 Constitution, as stipulated in section 2(b)(v). The 
purpose of the Act, as far as it relates to hate speech, is described in section 2(e) and 2(f) as being 
the education of the public about hate speech and the provision of remedies for hate speech 
infringements.  
 
Section 10 prohibits hate speech as follows: 
        1) Subject to the proviso in section 12, no person may publish, propagate, advocate or communicate 
words based on one or more of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be 
construed to demonstrate a clear intention to- 
a)        be hurtful; 
b)        be harmful or to incite harm; 
c)        promote or propagate hatred. 
        2) Without prejudice to any remedies of a civil nature under this Act, the court may, in accordance with 
section 21(2)(n) and where appropriate, refer any case dealing with the publication, advocacy, 
propagation or communication of hate speech as contemplated in subsection (1), to the Director of 
Public Prosecutions having jurisdiction for the institution of criminal proceedings in terms of the 
common law or relevant legislation. 
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PEPUDA therefore places a civil liability on individuals guilty of hate speech and at the same 
time in section 10(2) affirms the importance of common law remedies. It goes on to open the 
door to further „relevant legislation‟ which indicates room for criminalisation of hate speech, 
referring to the use of criminal sanctions but not extending into this sphere. Section 15 excludes 
hate speech from the grounds for justification of fairness in section 14 of PEPUDA. Section 21 
confers powers on the equality court to try hate speech cases along with the possibility of 
referring the case to another court in terms of section 21(4). 
 
Currie and De Waal criticise PEPUDA, identifying it as something that adds „a great deal of 
nomenclature that is either superfluous or that considerably widens the scope of the 
constitutional conception of hate speech‟.377  Exclusively, section 1(b) of PEPUDA, which 
contains the expression „incite to harm‟ falls directly within the ambit of section 16(2) of the 
1996 Constitution. The publication of statements based on a listed ground with the intention to 
be hurtful, harmful or promote hate decisively goes beyond the section 16(2) requirement of 
hatred coupled with „incitement to cause harm‟. This indicates that this is a limitation on 
freedom of expression as intended in the broad sense and that it would have to be reviewed 
under section 36 to be justifiable. The application of PEPUDA‟s hate speech provisions runs the 
risk of encroaching upon section 16(1) forms of protected speech which fall under the auspices 
of section 36. The use of the words „one or more of the prohibited grounds‟ could be construed 
as a reference to the prohibited grounds in terms of section 9, which reads as follows: 
 
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, 
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
 
This widens the scope of hate speech considerably when compared to the 16(2) construction 
disallowing hate speech based on „race, ethnicity, gender or religion‟.  If, however, the 
legislature refers to the listed grounds in section 16(2)(c) there is no scope extension. The 
advocacy of hatred which must be coupled with incitement and an intention to inflict harm is 
much narrower than the publication of words that is intended to be hurtful, harmful or promote 
hate. 
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Section 16(2) incorporates two elements, namely „incitement‟ and to „cause harm‟ in its 
exclusion of hate speech from constitutional protection. In dropping these requirements 
PEPUDA considerably broadens the scope of hate speech as contemplated in section 16(2)(c) 
and indicates an unwillingness „to take on the language of the ICCPR‟s Article 20‟.378   
 
Those requirements, as set out by the Constitution and ratified international treaties, should form 
the base requirements of limiting legislation. The aim of the legislation should be to clarify 
uncertainty and not to broaden the scope of the modification, except if it is necessary as 
described in section 36 as a limitation that is „reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom‟.  
 
When analysing section 10(1)(a) with reference to a practical example, the tension within this 
section becomes evident. If the NG Church of South Africa denounces the validity of gay 
marriage in line with Biblical dogma, this would equate to advocacy of words against a group of 
individuals that would undoubtedly be hurtful and would be based on a listed ground, namely 
that of sexual preference. The church as a juristic person would therefore incur liability if strict 
interpretation was followed. It is clear from the analysis that the construction of PEPUDA may 
be ineffective.  
 
Section 10(1)(a) is therefore at risk of failing to withstand constitutional scrutiny due to the 
overly broad construction of the text.
379
 Once this is affirmed it would clearly mean that the law 
now no longer falls under section 16(2) but encroaches upon section 16(1). Rights balancing 
along with the weighting test laid down in section 36(2) will provide a definitive answer as to 
whether this limiting legislation is constitutional. The nature of the rights concerned, the 
importance and purpose of the limitation, as well as the proportionality of the limitation and 
purpose will need to be investigated. If there are less restrictive means to achieve what PEPUDA 
sets out to achieve it will not stand the test of constitutionality. The legislature therefore regulates 
hate speech very broadly in a catch-all manner. It is unlikely that the construction of section 10 
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will avoid the application of section 36 as it clearly encroaches upon section 16(1). When 
evaluated in terms of section 16(1) there is a risk that the limitation might be declared 
unconstitutional based on its very wide construction.
380
  
 
In Jamiat-Ul-Ulama v Johncom Media Investment Ltd and Others the High Court disallowed the 
publication of a cartoon depicting the prophet Mohammed with the demeaning line „stop, stop 
we ran out of virgins‟ out of respect for dignity in a rights balancing approach to the limitation of 
freedom of expression.
381
  The High Court held that:  
 
Although freedom of expression is fundamental in our democratic society, it is not a paramount value. It 
must be construed in the context of other values enshrined in our Constitution, in particular the values of 
human dignity, freedom and equality.
382
 
 
The importance of dignity, equality and freedom in line with South Africa‟s cultural connection 
was highlighted, making it clear that freedom of expression is an important fundamental right in 
South Africa‟s democracy but not an overriding or supreme value.383  The importance of this 
case for the purpose of the study can be deduced from the fact that the court did not need to 
utilise PEPUDA at all to arrive at its rule nisi verdict and solely found for the applicant based on 
constitutional principles. To date the CC has yet to rule on the constitutionality of PEPUDA and 
arguments against criminalisation could be formulated on the basis of the presumption that the 
1996 Constitution offers sufficient over-arching protection against the negative effects of hate 
speech, as it did in Jamiat-Ul-Ulama. 
 
After the promulgation of PEPUDA the ad hoc Joint Committee on Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Bill adopted a resolution to further their process and 
criminalise hate speech and also give effect to ICERD and CEDAW. The ratification led to the 
drafting of the DHSB, which to date has not been promulgated.   
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4.3.2 The Draft Hate Speech Bill 
 
The DHSB recognises that the 1996 Constitution commits South Africa to societal 
transformation that is based on „social justice, human dignity, equality and the advancement of 
human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism‟. It affirms South Africa as a 
signatory to the ICERD, which requires signatories to criminalise ideas „based on racial 
superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination as well as acts of violence or incitement 
to such acts‟ in article 4(a).  The preamble to the DHSB sets out the purpose of the proposed 
legislation as being the criminalisation of participation in or promotion of hate speech based on 
„race, ethnicity, gender or religion‟ in order to achieve a discrimination-free South Africa. 
 
Section 1 confirms the application of the proposed Act as a law of general application which 
should not exclude or limit the concurrent functioning of any other legislation or the common 
law which is inconsistent with the Act. Should conflict arise between the proposed Act and 
another law or common law principles, the proposed Act prevails solely over hate speech under 
the auspices of the 1996 Constitution.  
 
Without a clear definition of what hate speech entails, section 2 attempts to criminalise a variety 
of actions which are representative of apartheid crimes as follows: 
 
2. (1) Any person who in public advocates hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion 
against any other person of group of persons that could, in the circumstances, reasonably be construed to 
demonstrate an intention to –  
(a) be hurtful; 
(b) be harmful or to incite harm; 
(c) intimidate or threaten; 
(d) promote or propagate racial, ethnic, gender or religious superiority; 
(e) incite imminent violence; 
(f) cause or perpetuate systemic disadvantage; 
(g) undermine human dignity; or 
(h) adversely affect the equal enjoyment of any person‟s or group of person‟s rights and freedoms in a 
serious manner, is guilty of an offence. 
 
83 
 
The section 16(2) requirement of „incitement to cause harm‟ is excluded from most of the 
possibilities of hate speech listed in all the section 2 subsections, with the exception of (b) and 
(e). This significantly extends the scope of hate speech in the DHSB. What is required is that 
hate is publically advocated against one or more of the identified groups along with one of the 
listed elements such as intent to hurt, propagation of superiority or intimidation. Such a 
construction is very broad and can easily intrude on freedom of expression as contemplated in 
section 16(1) with section 2(h) acting as a catch-all clause, clearly extending beyond what would 
be allowed in terms of section 36. Section 2(g) is not at home under hate speech provisions and 
should instead fall under equality provisions of section 9 of the 1996 Constitution as it attempts 
to limit expressions that could affront dignity in a broad sense.  
 
Within rights-based dispensations, compromise is part of the package. A study of section 2 
suggests that the legislature attempted to do away with speech that could possibly affect anyone 
negatively, which is obviously too broad, weakening the legislative process and possibly 
violating the principles of fundamental justice.
384
 The notion of compromise is completely erased 
by this provision and this could easily result in obscurity.  
 
By prohibiting any expression that could be hurtful one runs the risk of extending crimes as far 
as intimate personal relationships. Should an ex-wife, resentful because of her failed marriage, 
advocate hate towards the male sex and her ex-husband in particular, this could be interpreted as 
falling within the ambit of section 2(1)(a) as such expressions could be interpreted as hatred 
based on gender which sets out to be hurtful. Expressions made in an emotional state of disarray 
could prima facie constitute crimes under DHSB. The construction of section 2(1)(a) is clearly 
too broad and represents a conservative rather than a liberalist view which is characteristic of 
communist and socialist states.    
 
Section 2(1)(c) is another example of a weak legislative attempt. It attempts to prohibit hatred 
that intimidates or threatens on listed grounds that include race, ethnicity, gender and religion. 
Such a broad formulation could be widely understood to include even the mere verbalising of 
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ordinary dislike of a co-worker. Should the DHSB be promulgated it would represent a severe 
inroad into freedom of expression as contemplated in section 16 of the 1996 Constitution. An 
attempt to criminalise anything that can hurt is far from ideal and possibly a reason why the 
DHSB has never been promulgated. Ndungu characterised the DHBS as „wide and subjective 
and not clearly defined enough to ensure an objective test in court‟.385 Terreblanche and Quintal 
affirm this interpretation of the DHSB proposing that justice cannot be served where a person 
could be found guilty of a crime purely based on saying something with the „intention to be 
hurtful, harmful or to intimidate‟.386   
 
Section 2(1)(h) ultimately serves as an overarching catch all clause for all forms of hate 
expression that have not specifically been identified in section 2. The application of this 
provision would bring with it a cumbersome interpretation process as it clearly extends the hate 
speech crime into the realm of section 16(1)‟s forms of protected speech. The application of the 
section 36 limitation test would probably result in the provision being struck down as the 
limitation is disproportionate to the purpose. What the legislature seems to be saying here is that 
any other negative or hurtful expression that could affect the enjoyment of a subject‟s rights 
could possibly be a crime. This interpretation confirms Bentley‟s view that legislation 
criminalising hate speech will most likely be ineffective.
387
 Haigh is opposed to this legislative 
criminalisation approach, which he terms „unnecessary, unworkable, and incapable of fulfilling 
its object and purpose‟.388   
 
The DHBS must clearly define what is allowed and what is prohibited instead of using general 
catch-all clauses. It must define hate speech in the South African context, drawing on its unique 
cultural connection.  The elements of the crime should be more clearly formulated to include 
publically advocated hate, which is directed towards a defined group, expressed with intent and 
inspires violence or an imminent breach of the peace. The boundaries must be cornered off to 
avoid ambiguity such as that created by section 2(h), which refers to infringement that adversely 
affects the equal enjoyment of rights. Such a construction is an equality provision rather than a 
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hate speech provision. The important requirement that legislation should be internally protective 
towards democratic ideals and rights balancing is not met by the DHSB.  
 
Freedom of expression, which was traditionally regulated under common-law,
389
 is now intended 
to be regulated through a rules based approach as opposed to a principle based approach.
390
  The 
Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) welcomed the proposed DHBS as a reactive measure 
against the „shocking rise of incidents(sic) of race based and racially motivated crimes‟ but at the 
same time criticised it as „overly broad, extensive and inherently vague‟.391  Legislation should 
be constructed in such a manner that it acts as a guide for what is allowed and what is not 
allowed. Catch-all clauses will not suffice and will be counter-democratic and against the 
interpretation provision of section 39(2). This construction is far too restrictive and does not 
promote the spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights. Section 2(e) and possibly the second part of 
section 2(b), which refers to advocating hatred with the intent to incite to harm, are the only two 
provisions that could definitely be interpreted as being in line with the spirit of the Bill of Rights 
as these sections are a mere replica of section 16(2).
392
  
 
The DHSB is unclear as to who carries the burden of proof but the formulation implies that it 
rests on the person expressing the communication which possibly goes against the „innocent until 
proven guilty‟ presumption and is unlikely to withstand constitutional scrutiny.393 If the DHSB is 
to be promulgated the burden of proof should rather rest on the State, adhering to principles of 
fundamental justice.  
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Section 2(2) of the DHSB defines the terms private and public places.
394
  If the identified hate 
speech is not expressed publicly there would be no violation of section 2(2). At first glance it 
seems that a person exercising his right to freedom of expression is at liberty to say what he 
likes, at least in his own home. However, section 2(3)(b) muddles this perception by extending 
public places to any place which the public can have access to by „invitation‟.  The possibility of 
extending public places even into the sphere of private homes becomes a reality. 
 
The exceptions to the rule are listed in section 3 and are equally controversial.
395
  Section 16(1) 
of the 1996 Constitution guarantees freedom of expression that extends to the press and the 
media, and to artistic, academic and scientific works. The inclusion of section 3 implies that the 
legislature is indirectly extending the section 16(1) protection to hate speech which takes an 
artistic, academic, scientific research or media report form. It can be argued that expressions, for 
example satirical political comics, stimulate political debate and should be protected. The value 
in hate-invested advertisements and academic research is contested, however. Both Kenya and 
Rwanda saw hate speech crimes as a result of media propaganda which ultimately led to fully 
fledged genocide in Rwanda. At this point of the analysis the DHSB has become a piece of 
legislation which seems to be overbroad in attempting to criminalise any form of injurious 
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(b) “public place” includes any place to which the public have access as of right or by invitation, whether 
express or implied and whether or not a charge is made for admission to the place.‟  
395
 DHSB n 30 – „(3) Section 2(1) does not apply to any bona fide engagement in –  
(a) artistic creativity; 
(b) academic and scientific inquiry; 
(c) fair and accurate reporting in the public interest; or 
(d) publication of any information, advertisement or notice that is in accordance with section 16 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.‟ 
See the National Integration and Cohesion Act n 340 with Kenya specifically steering away from these kinds of 
exclusions as there is a very real risk that the press and even music/artistic expressions could be used to stir hatred. 
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speech. In section 3 it indirectly and in some cases illegitimately, extends immunity for hate 
speech crimes, which nullifies its purpose.  
 
Section 4 of the Draft Bill affirms that the common law principle of vicarious liability applies to 
this piece of legislation. The ideal of the DHSB which is the prevention of „dissemination of 
ideas based on racial superiority or hatred‟396 is in line with international conventions but the 
DHSB itself is not in line with constitutional principles and is possibly „unworkable‟.397  The fact 
that the DHSB may well be inoperable does not mean that the need for criminalisation is erased 
and Teichner‟s opinion that dignity cannot be protected without limiting certain forms of free 
speech still rings true.
398
  What is needed is for the legislature to return to the drawing board as 
far as hate speech provisions are concerned in order to arrive at a workable solution which 
combines legislative criminalisation with judicial interpretation, utilising the advantages of both 
systems to promote the spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights. 
 
The DHSB could be interpreted as an attempt to expand the closed list of forms of expression 
that are excluded from constitutional protection in section 16(2).
399
  This extension might be 
necessary to include, for example, hate speech based on sexual preference or sex, including 
homosexuality and transgender cases. Such an extension would have to suffice the article 36 
requirements in line with a rights balancing approach.  
 
The risk of over-legislating and returning to the apartheid government‟s restricted speech 
approach should be carefully considered when dealing with hate speech criminalisation. Freedom 
of expression and within that ambit, political expression, has had a colourful history in South 
Africa. The apartheid reality was one of strict control with Acts limiting free speech such as the 
Black Administration Act
400
 and the Internal Security Act
401
 promulgated. These Acts were 
promulgated with an apartheid agenda and were not necessarily reflective of the values and 
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norms of society.
402
  The value of freedom of expression was recognised in the African National 
Congress‟s (ANC) Freedom Charter, which stated that: 
 
…the law shall guarantee to all their right to speak, to organise, to meet together, to publish, to preach, to 
worship and to educate their children.
403
   
 
The legislature should take the greatest care in the formulation of its criminalisation of hate 
speech to avoid the recurrence of past, counter-democratic practices. As hate speech is not a 
crime in South Africa it has become important to analyse the view of the courts on hate speech 
in order to understand how the lacuna in hate speech regulation can be closed. 
 
 
4.3 The South African courts, commissions and tribunals on freedom of political 
expression and hate speech 
 
The need for criminalising hate speech as a stand-alone crime becomes evident from the case law 
analysis that follows. The current position of the South African courts on hate speech and 
freedom of political expression will be analysed and compared with the non-binding 
interpretations of the SAHRC and the Broadcasting Complaints Tribunal (BCTSA) in order to 
clarify the exact extent of the lacuna in the common law and current legislation on hate speech.   
 
4.4.1  The Constitutional Court‟s interpretation of hate speech and freedom of political 
expression 
 
Insight can be gained into the CC‟s view on hate speech from the Islamic Unity case.404  In this 
case the CC affirmed the importance of freedom of expression and the need for limitation but at 
the same time the CC emphasised that regulations that encroach on section 16(1) forms of 
                                                 
402
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expression will be tested against section 36 and that a rights balancing approach will be 
followed. It affirmed the lacuna in hate speech regulation for section 16(2) forms of expression.  
 
In this matter the CC had to decide on the application brought against Radio 786 for the 
responses by Dr Zaki on the legitimacy of Israel as a state as well as Holocaust denial in the 
sense that he downplayed the number of Jewish deaths to one million and completely denied the 
use of gas chambers by the Nazi regime.
405
  Langa DCJ identified the question as whether or not 
clause 2(a) of the Code of Conduct for Broadcasting Services (CCBS) was in line with section 16 
of the 1996 Constitution.
406 
 The CC quoted South African National Defence Union affirming the 
importance of the right to freedom of expression as follows: 
 
freedom of expression is one of a “web of mutually supporting rights” in the Constitution. It is closely 
related to freedom of religion, belief and opinion (s 15), the right to dignity (s 10), as well as the right to 
freedom of association (s 18) … The rights implicitly recognise the importance, both for a democratic 
society and for individuals personally, of the ability to form and express opinions, whether individually or 
collectively, even where those views are controversial.
407
 
 
A libertarian view is evident as the court is willing to protect even contentious speech, stating 
that free speech is imperative even when deemed controversial.
408
 The CC stressed that the right 
to freedom of expression has always been recognised by the South African common law and 
established that the apartheid government‟s restrictions on this freedom were not compatible 
with a democratic South Africa.
409
   
 
The CC ignored the offence principle on limitation, reiterating that freedom of expression 
extends beyond those ideas that are socially acceptable, to cover even the obscene, vulgar and 
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distasteful.
410
 Langa DCJ stated that open-mindedness and pluralism are integral to a democratic 
society but warned that a society can also be destabilised by counter-productive speech which 
impedes the idea of democracy itself. This affirmed the use of the harm principle in South 
Africa.
411
 South Africa‟s cultural connection as reflected in the founding provisions of the 1996 
Constitution‟s dignity-equality-freedom looking glass is clear from his words: 
 
Section 1 of the Constitution declares that South Africa is founded on the values of “human dignity, the 
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms.”  Thus, open and democratic 
societies permit reasonable proscription of activity and expression that pose a real and substantial threat to 
such values and to the constitutional order itself. Many societies also accept limits on free speech in order 
to protect the fairness of trials. Speech of an inflammatory or unduly abusive kind may be restricted so as 
to guarantee free and fair elections in a tranquil atmosphere.
412
    
 
The crux of the argument was made when the court held that the section 16(2) listed forms of 
speech namely; war propaganda, incitement to imminent violence and hate speech, do not have 
to withstand the section 36 limitation test.  
 
The legislature is not prohibited from introducing regulative measures through legislation falling 
within the ambit of section 16(2) and the need for such legislation was reiterated, affirming the 
current lacuna in hate speech regulation.
413
 The need for legislation and regulation specifically in 
broadcasting was affirmed in Langa DCJ‟s statement:  
 
I have considered each submission in the light of what would be appropriate relief in the circumstances of 
this case. If the relevant portion of clause 2(a) were struck down in its entirety with nothing to replace it, a 
dangerous gap would result. Since the Constitution specifically mandates regulation in this field, it would 
be neither just and equitable nor in the public interest to allow such a gap to exist.
414
  
 
The interaction with section 36‟s limitation clause when legislative prohibitions encroach on 
section 16(1) was also affirmed. Langa DCJ‟s stated that the legislature can choose to regulate at 
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a minimal level or extensively going beyond section 16(2) but then subject to section 36(1).
415
 
The court then held that the prohibition of the CCBS clause 2(a) extends beyond section 16(2), 
as it not only limits hate speech, war propaganda and incitement to imminent violence but in 
addition a variety of other section 16(1) protected forms of expression.
416
  This type of 
encroachment was held to be subject to section 36 with rights balancing as an effective manner 
in which to limit freedom of political expression effectively. The CC clearly sees limitation as 
being in order should the situation call for it. As a result of South Africa‟s past the values of 
dignity, equality and freedom have had a greater influence on the formation of the South African 
democracy and speech and activities that pose a real threat to these democratic values must and 
should be curbed. 
 
The importance of the content of speech in order to categorise it as section 16(1) protected or 
section 16(2) unprotected was affirmed in Laugh it off promotions CC v South African 
Breweries.
417
 The text within context test was employed to effectively distinguish and categorise 
speech. The fact that section 16(1) forms of expression are effectively limited by the section 36 
general limitation clause was affirmed. The court dealt with the proper interface between section 
16(1) and the protection of intellectual property rights embedded in trademarks. It held that the 
slogan „black labour, white guilt‟ did not amount to hate speech as the slogan poked fun at 
exploitative labour practices rather than pure racism. This demonstrated the CC‟s commitment to 
freedom of expression as an integral right taking all facts and circumstances into consideration. 
 
The fears that all race-related expressions in South Africa might be suppressed and free 
expression sacrificed for the sake of dignity are by no means realised in the approach of the CC. 
The CC confirmed that any form of expression that is not a section 16(2) form of unprotected 
speech enjoys the full protection of the 1996 Constitution.
418
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4.4.2 Findings of the South African Human Rights Committee (SAHRC) 
 
An analysis of the hate speech incidences investigated by the SAHRC identifies a clear liberalist 
view in line with that of the CC as studied above. In 1997 the SAHRC heard the Federal Council 
case relating to utterances made by ANC politicians PR Mokaba, R Kasrils and SR Maharaj 
about the National Party leader FW De Klerk where the complainant claimed that the words 
were of a hate speech nature and negatively affected the victim‟s dignity.419  The matter 
concerned utterances made about De Klerk‟s alleged involvement in the disappearance of 
Charles Ndaba and Mvuso Tshabalala in 1990, members of the ANC who were allegedly 
involved in a plot to overthrow the government.
420
  It was implied that FW De Klerk knew that 
the two operatives, whose bodies were found dumped in the Tugela River, had been arrested and 
that he was somehow involved in their deaths. Taken in context, it is clear that hate speech is 
absent from the statements and that they are rather a form of political criticism which would fall 
within the ambit of section 16(1) protected speech.
421
  The SAHRC found in favour of the 
defendants, stating that open democratic debate as a form of freedom of political expression is 
vital within the new South African dispensation and finding that the words fell into this category 
of protected speech.
422
  The importance of text within context and whether or not hate speech 
would be found to be present by the objective reasonable person is what solidifies the importance 
of this interpretation.  
   
In 1999 the SAHRC heard the Constand Viljoen case, where 86 dogs were killed by farmers in a 
black community. The subsequent statements made by Dumisani Makhaye on the police‟s failure 
to act against the farmers were alleged to be hate speech.
423
 The complaint by General Constand 
Viljoen implied that Makhaye‟s words amounted to hate speech against white farmers and 
ultimately lead to farm murders.
424
 Makhaye insinuated that farmers will have to blame 
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themselves if the dog killings lead to the African community destroying farms and killing 
farmers, because they felt unsafe after the killings. Three tests for positive hate speech were used 
in Constand Viljoen:
425
 The imminent test, the text within context test and the reasonable person 
test. 
 
The SAHRC drew insight from both foreign and international law in terms of section 39. It 
investigated the USA absolutist approach in Abrahams, warning that the Supreme Court should 
be vigilant not to limit any forms of expression unless they imminently threaten death, violent 
action or breach of peace.
426
 It may have erred in its interpretation by extending imminence into 
section 16(2)(c) which would have been included textually had the constitutional drafters 
considered it imperative, as they did in section 16(2)(b). The SAHRC explained the imminent 
test as derived from the USA fighting words doctrine. Fighting words are words that when 
uttered, inflict injury and cause harm coupled with incitement to the imminent breach of 
peace.
427
  The test was applied in Constand Viljoen and it was held that because five months had 
elapsed since the statement when a farmer was killed no causal connection could be made 
between the two events.
428
 Imminent is defined as immediate or near and „may carry the 
implication of menace‟.429  Five months was rightly held as not being immediate or near.  
 
The imminent test is reminiscent of the causality test in the law of delict. If no causal connection 
between the hate speech uttered and the actual acts of violence can be established the imminent 
test will fail and the interpretation will be that the words do not amount to hate speech. The 
commission therefore held that the speech was neither incitement to imminent violence nor 
incitement to hatred as described in sections 16(2)(b) and (c).  The interpretation that causality 
was lacking is correct if based on the principles of the law of delict, but it is possibly incorrect to 
imply that the constitutional drafters accidently omitted the word imminent from section 
16(2)(c). The Commission should guard against an absolutist interpretation that will bring the 
imminent test, which directly correlates with the fighting words doctrine, into the South African 
hate speech precedent.  
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The text within context test implies the following: One should analyse the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the alleged hate speech utterances, reading the intention and meaning 
of the utterances within the context of the speech.
430
 When words are separated from the context 
of the utterance misinterpretation is sure to follow. The test has to be used in conjunction with 
the reasonable person test in order to arrive at the correct answer. In Constandt Viljoen the 
utterances were analysed in terms of the text within context test and the finding was that the 
words did not amount to hate speech.
431
   
 
The reasonable person test acts as an equalising factor to avoid over-sensitivity and emotion 
being decisive elements when dealing with cases involving extreme emotions such as hate 
speech cases.  Hatred is defined as an „intense, passionate, or active dislike‟ coupled with „a 
disposition to injure‟.432 Individualism, upbringing and personal sensitivity could lead to 
different people‟s perceiving words in different ways.433  A hate speech analysis therefore needs 
to include the reasonable person test, which implies taking an objective view of the situation and 
assessing how the reasonable person would perceive the communication within the context in 
which it is uttered.
434
           
 
The SAHRC dismissed hearing an enquiry into hate speech based on the text within context test 
in 2000 when a complaint of racism against the then DA leader Tony Leon was made based on 
statements made during a political rally in the Western Cape.
435
 Mr Leon insinuated that the 
ANC marginalised coloured people and used Mr Trevor Manuel as an example of a man of 
excellent political standing not even being mentioned as a candidate for higher positions such as 
that of deputy president or the like, implying that this was possibly because „he is a so called 
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coloured‟.436  This dismissal highlights the fact that the SAHRC holds a clear idea of matters that 
legitimately fall within scope of section 16(2)(c) when utilising the text within context test.  At 
the same time it indicates that the South African courts and commissions could become 
overburdened with attempted cases of hate speech in a society sensitive to racial talk, further 
strengthening the need for legislation that clearly defines hate speech and its possible criminal 
consequences, with the state instituting action when needed.   
    
In Agri-Wes the SAHRC heard a matter regarding utterances made by Mr Tony Ehrenreich on 
land reclaims and held that certain statements did not amount to hate speech in terms of section 
16(2)(c) or PEPUDA.
437
 A finding that statements such as „we are here today to declare war‟ and 
„we will take the land and give it back to the rightful owners‟ do not suffice the requirements of 
PEPUDA in section 10 could be contested. PEPUDA‟s requirements are far less stringent than 
those of section 16(2)(c) and possibly extend beyond it. The construction of section 10 prohibits 
the propagating/advocating of words based on listed grounds which could reasonably be 
construed to have the obvious intention to be hurtful, harmful or incite to harm without the 
inclusion of a need for imminent action. This indicates that the statement should possibly have 
been found to violate section 10.  
 
The cautionary words of Govender J in Freedom Front should always be borne in mind when 
deciding whether any particular expression amounts to hate speech:  
 
Any test used to assess whether expression amounts to hate speech must acknowledge the seriousness of 
such a classification.
438
  
 
The finding that these statements do not amount to incitement to imminent violence in terms of 
section 16(2)(b) is clearly correct when the statements are analysed in  context. A clear 
distinction should be drawn between section 16(2)(b) and 16(2)(c), where the one deals with 
incitement to imminent violence and the other with hateful incitement to cause harm. When 
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applying the text within context test it is clear that Ehrenreich‟s words speak of restitution rather 
than a malevolent intention to cause harm. The imminent test is sufficed as his words did not 
inspire actual action to immediately take up arms and engage in war.  
 
In 2010 the SAHRC heard the case Manamela v Shapiro
439
 in a complaint lodged because of a 
cartoon depicting Mr Jacob Zuma with his trousers down while the tripartite alliance holds down 
a blindfolded girl. The cartoon was published during the time when Mr Zuma was facing rape 
charges. It was argued that the cartoon infringed Mr Zuma‟s right to dignity but the respondent 
held that he was exercising his right to freedom of expression and that his cartoon was intended 
as satirical political commentary. It was affirmed that the free „market-place of ideas‟ is vitally 
important in a South African democracy which is still establishing itself.
440
 The SAHRC stated 
that section 16 suggests that a closed list of forms of expression „requires a higher degree of 
protection‟.441 This implies that academic, artistic and free press communication, which 
seemingly takes on the form of hate speech, could deserve protection but the SAHRC did not err 
in its interpretation in interpreting dangerous hate speech which incites to harm into this closed 
list of protected forms of speech. 
 
Academic, artistic and free press communication will only be escalated to the level of hate 
speech and therefore not protected if „there is also incitement to cause harm‟.442 The importance 
of the SAHRC finding lies in the extension of the definition of harm to include emotional, 
psychological and dignity harm in a manner that is protective towards audience rights.
443
 The 
SAHRC finally held that despite its offensive nature, the cartoon did not constitute hate speech 
„or a violation of any fundamental human right contained in the Constitution‟.444 This again 
confirms that the South African judiciary does not easily acknowledge the offence principle in 
hate speech cases but rather the harm principle. This disallowance was based on the fact that 
incitement to cause harm could not be found to be present.  
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It would appear that the SAHRC transferred the requirement of imminent action incorrectly to 
section 16(2)(c) in Constand Viljoen and Agri-Wes, which was not the intention of the 
constitutional drafters. Both PEPUDA and the 1996 Constitution suggest that the imminent test 
does not have a place in South African hate speech regulation. 
 
4.4.3   Hate speech, political expression and the Broadcasting Complaints Tribunal of South 
Africa (BCTSA) 
 
The BCTSA
445
 affirmed the position of the reasonable person test in Pollak where it held that 
certain anti-imperialistic statements, read from an e-mail received from Mr Fourie by Vuyo 
Mbuli, a talk show host on his daily „Talk Radio‟ show, did not amount to hate speech nor 
contravene the Broadcasting Code which prohibits the promotion of violence and offensive 
language.
446
 At the same time it held that the anti-Semitic statements were not „inflammatory … 
so as to exceed the bounds of tolerance‟, which confirms the position of the reasonable person 
test within the BCTSA‟s adjudication of hate speech.447  
 
Excerpts from the e-mail included statements against the US leadership, which was said to use 
war to exploit nations such as Iraq for their natural resources with the aid of funding supposedly 
obtained from Jewish interest groups. The tribunal held that the talk of pressure being put on the 
South African Department of Foreign Affairs to forcibly expel Iraqi diplomats did not amount to 
a violation of clause 35.2 of the Broadcasting Code as it was held to encompass a matter of 
public importance which would fall within the ambit of the Equality Act‟s section 12 
exclusions.
448
  
 
The tribunal mentioned the fact versus fiction problem within the contents of the e-mail and 
commented that Mr Fourie‟s viewpoint is not new and is shared by many. The fact versus fiction 
question was further not regarded as core to a hate speech analysis in South Africa in the same 
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way as in Germany, where it is at times decisive.
449
 The BCTSA established that the purpose of 
the adjudication process is not to distinguish the facts from fiction as this would be a near-
impossible task. The tribunal then turned to the CC at the hand of Kriegler J‟s comments in S v 
Mamabolo affirming the importance of freedom of expression and open exchange within the 
„marketplace of ideas‟.450 The tribunal confirmed that hate speech „amounts to an abuse of this 
freedom‟ which is reflective of the tribunal‟s liberalist view.451 It established the finding in 
Human Rights Commission of South Africa v SABC that the test for hate speech is an objective 
one.
452
 
 
The tribunal then went on to discuss the second element of the double-barrelled hate speech 
question:  Incitement to cause harm.
453
 When faced with an analysis of a hate speech, time has to 
be spent analysing the material as well as the objective content of the expression. The tribunal 
held that based on an objective analysis the words read by Mr Mbuli amounted to „the free and 
open exchange of ideas‟ in exercise of the section 16(1) right to freedom of expression.454 No 
incitement to harm could objectively be established in the content of the e-mail. Incitement 
equates to provocation directed at an audience in order to inspire them to cause harm and if such 
negative inspiration is missing, hate speech will be absent.  
   
In Polakow v Radio Islam the BCTSA heard a matter on derogatory comments made about Jews 
in a radio broadcast debating the Palestine-Israel crisis in the Middle East.
455
 The tribunal held 
that an analysis as to whether clause 3 of the Code has been contravened must be done by 
concurrently analysing whether the requirements of section 29 of the Films Act, which makes 
allowance for certain bona fide discussions if in the public interest, have been met.
456
 Section 29 
of the Films Act is in line with 16(1)(a) of the 1996 Constitution, which guarantees the freedom 
of the press and media and section 12 of PEPUDA, which prohibits the broadcasting of 
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information that intends to unfairly discriminate, unless it amounts to fair and truthful reporting 
that is in public interest.  
   
The BCTSA held that „there is no geographical or time limit: Hate speech is hate speech‟.457  
Hate speech, in the South African context, can therefore cross borders if harm is evident. At the 
same time the BCTSA held that proving imminent incitement across a wide geographical 
distance is extremely cumbersome. Based on the findings of Human Rights Commission of South 
Africa the tribunal reiterated that the harm does not necessarily imply physical harm only but can 
extend to psychological harm.
458
 Furthermore, harm must take on a real form and cannot be 
found to be present merely on the basis of „lack of tolerance or over-sensitiveness‟.459  
 
During the broadcast made on 19/08/2002 various anti-Semitic statements, including „Kutile al 
Yahoud!‟, which is translated as „Kill the Jews‟, were made. The station responded that such 
statements were opinion based and did not amount to hate speech. The South African view that 
once political expression takes on the form of hate speech it loses its constitutional protection 
was reaffirmed. The tribunal held that: 
 
Although the respondent cautioned the speaker beforehand, we find that the respondent was negligent in 
having broadcast a live interview with a speaker that the management must have known to have 
controversial views on Jews. The words complained of amount to hatred based on race and amounts to a 
call to kill the people targeted. The harm lies in the serious invasion of the rights of personality and the 
right to security of Jews:  the rights that, inter alia, protect life, body and emotional peace of mind; rights, 
which the Constitution protects.
460
   
 
As a result of further comments made by Mr Imraan Hussain, which constituted support for 
suicide bombing, which usually causes the death of innocent civilians, along with insinuations of 
rape and justified war, the tribunal held that the comments did fall within the ambit of hate 
speech coupled with incitement to cause harm. The BCTSA correctly interpreted incitement to 
cause harm, which manifests as psychological harm, as immediate once the words have been 
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uttered. This was affirmed in Human Rights Commission of South Africa where injuries to the 
dignitas were deemed immediate and were deemed to take place upon the utterance of the 
hateful words, not incorporating the imminent test.
461
 In view of the differences between the 
interpretations of the SAHRC and the BCTSA, which interpreted harm liberally as even harm 
having effect beyond the South African borders, the need for consistency through the use of 
legislation becomes evident. Speech taking on a criminal colour and causing extreme emotional, 
dignity or psychological harm combined with the risk of escalation into other serious crimes 
such as mass murder, malicious injury to property and genocide, extending beyond the reach of 
PEPUDA, requires regulation and the common law does not seem to offer sufficient remedies. 
 
4.4.4 The hate speech findings of the Equality Court and the High Court 
 
In 2009 the Equality Court for the district of Johannesburg heard the widely reported case 
against Mr Julius Malema concerning his commentary on the Jacob Zuma rape trial. The Sonke 
Gender Justice Network made a hate speech and harassment complaint based on South Africa‟s 
ratification of CEDAW.
462
 The complainant held that the words amount to hate speech under 
section 10 of PEPUDA but the respondent submitted that his words fell within the ambit of 
section 12 of PEPUDA, amounting to fair comment.   
 
The court held that words may amount to hate speech if they fall within the ambit of the section 
10 definition of hate speech disallowing publication, propaganda, advocacy and communication 
of words on one or more of the listed grounds which the reasonable person would construe as 
demonstrating intention to hurt, intention to incite harm or propagate hatred.
463
  The court 
narrowly interpreted this section to include only words and not pictures and non-verbal 
communication. This is possibly not in line with the section 16 interpretation of freedom of 
expression as a whole, which extends beyond mere speech. This interpretation leaves room for 
possible abuse of the prohibitions in PEPUDA by allowing hate speech-charged nonverbal 
communication, pictures, photographs, comics etc which could be equally hurtful to fall through 
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 Human Rights Commission n 452. 
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 Sonke Gender Justice Network v Mr. Julius Malema (File no 02/2009). Julius Malema made the following 
statement which inspired the complaint:  „When a woman didn‟t enjoy it, she leaves early in the morning.... You 
don‟t ask for taxi money from somebody who raped you.‟ 
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 Sonke n 462 para 12. 
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the cracks. In line with the finding in Polakow, the court held that hurt/harm extends beyond 
physical harm into the psychological realm of the emotive and of dignity.
464
   
 
The court formulated three tests to ascertain whether words amount to hate speech:
465
 
 Words communicated should fall within the parameters of prohibited grounds. 
 A reasonable person must construe the words as intended to hurt, harm or incite hate.466  
 The words should not fall within the ambit of the exclusions listed in section 12 of 
PEPUDA. 
The Equality Court therefore correctly omitted the imminent test as imminent action is not a 
requirement of section 16(2)(c) for hate speech. 
 
The court was ambiguous in its finding that words that fall within the exclusions listed in section 
12 amount to hate speech but carry no liability.
467
  A more accurate finding would be that such 
words do not constitute hate speech in view of the fact that they are one of the section 12 
exclusions.  
 
The court stressed the importance of the text within context test as formulated by the SAHRC in 
Federal Council and the complainant proceeded to prove that owing to the political orientation, 
place and time within which the utterances were made the words taken in context did amount to 
hate speech.
468
 The complainant next rebutted the respondent‟s reliance on fair comment as per 
section 12 by disproving the notion that he was commenting on a specific case.
469
 The court 
rejected the contentions by the respondent that his comments were fair and did not amount to 
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based on prohibited grounds or be considered hate speech by the reasonable person on the street. If the words 
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section 12 of PEPUDA. 
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 Sonke n 462 para 16. 
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 Sonke n 462 para 17. 
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 Comments and not facts. 
 Fair within reasonability limits. 
 The matter was of public interest.  
 Comments were not offered on false facts. 
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gender generalisations and injurious comments about rape, which is a critical problem in the 
South African community.
470
 A hate speech finding under the current law is of very little 
deterrent value, as is evident from the numerous subsequent cases heard against the same 
perpetrator. The case has subsequently been settled with apologies and the imposition of a fine. 
 
2010 saw the first series of „Shoot the Boer‟ cases with the North Gauteng High Court ignoring 
the imminent test, as it did in Polakow and Sonke and in addition ingoring the text within context 
test, decisively stating that the reasonable person test as used in Polak and Islamic Unity is 
sufficient: 
 
The true yardstick of hate speech is neither the historical significance thereof, nor the context in which the 
words are uttered, but the effect of the words, objectively considered upon those directly affected and 
targeted thereby.
471
 
 
It extended the objective test beyond whether the reasonable person would deem the words to be 
hate speech by including a harm element. The High Court stated that the objectively viewed 
consequence of the expression is the decisive element for a hate speech finding.
472
 The High 
Court referred the matter to the Equality Court made a provisional finding in anticipation of the 
Equality Court‟s pronouncement, holding that the words of the struggle song „Shoot the Boer‟ 
prima facie suffice the requirements of PEPUDA in section 10 and making a clear finding for 
hate speech by granting the prohibiting interdict.
473
 This finding is in line with Polakow‟s finding 
on „Kutile al Yahoud‟: No objective differentiation between the words „Shoot the Boer‟ and „Kill 
the Jews‟ were made.474   
 
The use of the song had previously been banned in Freedom Front and the complainant alleged 
that the song had been declared unconstitutional once before and this therefore represented a 
repetitive offence.
475
  De Vos highlights his concern regarding the basis on which the words of 
the song can be declared unconstitutional by accurately stating that section 16(2) removes certain 
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forms of expression from constitutional protection but does not allow the „banning‟ of such 
words.
476
 This fact affirms the need for regulation: If the 1996 Constitution does not protect hate 
speech but cannot ban certain words an alternative way to regulate the problem needs to be 
sought. This approach could be modelled on the manner in which the German legislature has 
dealt with Neo-Nazism by specifically criminalising such comments. This possibly represents a 
huge setback for free speech when viewed outside the cultural connection but one which is 
understandable and correct within the cultural connection.  The unsatisfied public outcry after the 
outcome of the ANC‟s internal disciplinary hearing against Mr Malema, which stated that he 
should attend anger management classes and imposed a fine of R10,000, further highlights South 
Africa‟s sensitivity to racial speech.  
  
In 2011 the Freedom Front Plus lodged further complaints against the singing of „dubula ibhunu‟ 
by Mr Julius Malema. The Freedom Front Plus alleged that four farmers were murdered in cold 
blood after the singing took place at a political rally held at a Johannesburg university.
477
 The 
continued institution of hate speech cases is evidence that the South African community is in 
need of strict regulation of hate speech that will help pave the way for a united future for South 
Africa. In May 2011 the High Court of Johannesburg made a finding of positive hate speech 
against the struggle song „dubula ibhunu‟ which translates as „Shoot the Boer‟.478  It was argued 
that the song was directed against white males, an identifiable race group as indicated in section 
16(2) and that there is a definite causal connection between the song and incitement to murder. If 
hate speech can be causally linked to murder and other crimes there is a dire need to criminalise 
this form of expression, which is socially and criminally deviant.
479
 In the past the struggle song 
was intended to inspire fear in the white oppressor and it was found that the intention of the song 
is still to inspire fear in white people.
480
 In September 2011 the Equality Court found that hate 
                                                 
476
 De Vos http://constitutionally speaking.co.za/ on-the-curious-case-of=shooting-the-boer/ (Date of use 
04/05/2010). 
477
 Case lodged with the Equality Court but not yet decided. Pleadings obtained from the complainant: Freedom 
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speech was present in Mr Malema use of the struggle song.
481
 Lamont J found that the right to 
freedom of expression and the signing of „dubula ibhunu‟ does not trump the dignity rights of 
those targeted by the lyrics.
482
 Colin LJ confirmed the discrepancy left by the fact that there is 
„no immediate criminal sanction.‟483 He went on to confirm the protective function of the courts, 
specifically toward minorities who are „vulnerable to discriminatory treatment‟ implying that 
their special needs places a clear duty of assistance on the courts.  This clearly indicates a 
favourable view on criminalisation indicating that this matter has perhaps reached a boiling point 
in South Africa‟s legal sphere.  Reasons for the finding have not yet been published at date of 
completion of this work.   
 
The future of hate speech in South Africa is still being shaped and Kriegler J‟s cautionary words 
against censorship in S v Mamabolo, namely that it could inhibit the development of the South 
African democracy, should be borne in mind.
484
 The call for legislation by the CC in Islamic 
Unity
485
 along with the Equality Court‟s finding in Sonke that certain words amount to hate 
speech but carry no liability warns of an unsatisfactory position as there are contraventions and 
rights infringements without any punishment.
486
 The recent upsurge in possible hate speech 
perpetrations under the guise of political expression such as those made by ANC Youth League 
president Mr Malema alerts us to the fact that hate speech is not regulated sufficiently in South 
Africa.  
 
4.5 Concluding on the hate speech lacuna in South African law 
 
The lacuna in the law, highlighted by the section 16(2) modification of freedom of expression, 
was affirmed through an analysis of the current common law remedies that could be utilised 
against the negative and possible criminal effects of hate speech. On the basis of the analysis of 
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current and proposed hate speech legislation along with case law precedent, a number of 
problems in South Africa‟s current regulation of hate speech have become evident.  
 
Inconsistency is found in the tests that are being applied by the different courts, tribunals and 
commissions, which makes it difficult to establish clear and concise guidelines for interpreting 
and limiting hate speech. Furthermore, the courts, tribunals and commissions seem to have 
inconsistent interpretations of PEPUDA, which adds to the complexity of the problem. 
 
A number of social factors such as a rise in the number and instances of hate speech cases and a 
public outcry in favour of hate speech criminalisation indicate a dire need for retribution and 
regulation. Repetitive cases brought against the same perpetrators representing recurring 
offences highlight the fact that the current regulation does not serve as an efficient method of 
deterrence.    
 
An analysis of the current body of case law indicates insufficient segregation between the 
different forms of unprotected speech. The need for imminent violence as contemplated in 
section 16(2)(b) has at times been read into the words of the hate speech provision in section 
16(2)(c), which could possibly imply an extension of the constitutional drafters‟ scope of the 
modification.  
 
Certain courts, tribunals and forums do not regard the psychological harm caused by hate speech 
equally seriously, although at times it could be more detrimental than physical harm. The very 
real fact that racially charged hate speech can have a domino effect resulting in hate crimes and 
the need for the prohibition of such actions calls for criminalising legislation to close the current 
gap in South Africa‟s hate speech regulation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION:  
Paving the way for hate speech regulation in South Africa 
 
5.1 Analysing the criminalisation of hate speech 
 
The decision whether to criminalise forms of unprotected speech demands an in-depth analysis 
of the advantages and disadvantages within the specific cultural context. The legislature‟s 
predisposition to criminalise negative forms of speech will be influenced by the model of 
freedom of expression embedded within the Constitution,
487
 the limitation approach as well as 
the nation‟s cultural connection and history.488 
 
The evident lacuna in hate speech regulation in South Africa has been affirmed and analysed in 
chapter 4.  Constitutional and common law remedies were found to be insufficient to regulate 
hate speech in the South African context and the civil liabilities imposed by PEPUDA overlap 
with common law remedies, doing very little to restrain perpetrators of hate speech or deter re-
offending. Chapter 3 clearly highlighted international support for the criminalisation of counter-
democratic hate speech and the South African legislature showed a propensity towards 
legislative criminalisation through the enactment of PEPUDA and the tabling of the DHSB. 
 
Dworkin‟s instrumental conception of freedom of expression as an important right that assist in 
toppling authoritarian regimes and aids democratisation is supported in South Africa however his 
unwavering support for freedom of expression as a right that trumps other rights is not in line 
with South African libertarianism.489  Where freedom of expression exceeds its boundaries the 
legislature limits it, in order to arrive at a balanced position for those exercising their right to 
freedom of expression and those negatively affected by the speech.
490
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Emerson‟s analysis of the US government‟s encroachment on freedom of political expression 
through the „Alien and Sedition Acts, passed in 1798, and the Espionage Act, [sic] effect(ed) 
during the First World War‟ serves as a warning for the South African legislature when faced 
with the issue of whether to criminalise hate speech.
491
 The same danger was inherent in the 
apartheid government‟s speech-limiting legislation, which inhibited transformation and 
liberation. The advantages and disadvantages of criminalisation should be weighed up in order to 
arrive at a balanced position that guarantees freedom of expression while countering the 
deconstructive effects of negative speech. 
 
5.1.1 The advantages and disadvantages of criminalising hate speech 
 
Advantages of criminalisation of hate speech: 
 Criminalisation of hate speech promotes social cohesion and the communitarian ideal. 
 Criminalisation sets clear boundaries as to what speech is acceptable for stimulating self-
development and what is not.
492
 
 Criminalisation establishes structure in a transitional democracy in which a rules based 
approach is most effective. 
 Criminalisation is imperative for democracies born from past atrocities and serves as a 
protective measure against re-occurrence.
493
 
 
Disadvantages of criminalisation of hate speech: 
 Possible encroachment on freedom of expression when viewed from an absolutist 
perception of democracy.
494
 
 Inhibition of self-actualisation.495 
                                                                                                                                                             
reality.  If the state, who has cumulative knowledge and more resources, instituted action on behalf of the aggrieved 
it could significantly alleviate the burden.    
491
 Emerson in O‟Brien n 62 4-5. 
492
 Heyman n 104 is of the opinion that valueless hate speech negatively affects the democratic process in that it 
silences the opposition.  
493
 Rwanda serves as a good example of a country where strict legislative prohibition (along with effective 
implementation thereof) could possibly have avoided recurrence of genocide. 
494
 Delgado & Stefanic n 313 3. He conceptualises democracy as requiring complete freedom of expression. 
Wellington n 61 1105, proposes that deviant expression should be punished to protect the democratic process.  
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 Difficulty in clearly defining hate speech, resulting in inconsistencies.496  
 Risk that legislative prohibitions can be used as a tool to silence political opposition. 
 
5.1.2 The advantages and disadvantages of not criminalising hate speech 
 
Advantages of not criminalising hate speech: 
 Non-interference promotes uninhibited truth discovery and self-actualisation.497 
 Not criminalising hate speech supports an absolutist conception of the democratic ideal 
which is borne out of free speech.
498
  
 By disallowing criminalisation one removes the risk that a government can use legislative 
measures to interfere with the democratic process.
499
 
 
Disadvantages of not criminalising hate speech: 
 Uninhibited free speech undermines social cohesion and promotes community segregation 
and in-group formation. 
 Without criminalising hate speech the dignity and equality rights of the audience are 
ignored, offering limited protection for the violation of their rights.
500
  
 Complete freedom ignores past atrocities and the fact that retribution, restoration and 
development are a continuous and sensitive process.  
 
From the analysis it is clear that there are both advantages and disadvantages to the 
criminalisation of hate speech. The correct answer will depend on the history, cultural 
connection, juristic tradition, level of democratic development and freedom of expression model 
of each dispensation. For South Africa the advantages of criminalising and the disadvantages of 
not criminalising hate speech outweigh the opposite course of action. The research study makes 
                                                                                                                                                             
495
 O‟Brien n 62.  
496
 This problem is evident from the analysis of the DHSB in chapter 4.  
497
 O‟Brien n 63 and  Milton n 65.  
498
 Adler n 289.  
499
 This interference is never purely eliminated. Even in an absolutist dispensation which opposes legislation, by 
appointing a pro-government bench of judges this interference is still possible through the appointed judiciary. The 
abuse of declaration of states of emergency is identified as another possible point for exploitation.  
500
 Delgado & Stefanic n 313 conceptualise the audience as the sacrificial lamb in a freedom first formulation of 
expression. 
109 
 
it clear that it is now up to the legislature to step in and regulate the negative effects of hate 
speech.  
 
5.2 Criminalisation as an effective measure against hate speech in South Africa  
 
The research question whether freedom of expression which manifests as hate speech should be 
limited was answered in the affirmative in chapters 2 and 3. The fact that the constitutional 
drafters modified
 
and limited freedom of expression in section 16(2) is clearly indicative of their 
presumption for limitation. Chapter 2 debated the reasons for and against limitation in the light 
of libertarianism and absolutism. It established the place of and need for limitation within South 
Africa as a libertarian state.  
 
Chapter 3 revealed a pro-limitation view from the international community and foreign 
comparatives studied. The ICCPR identifies respect for the rights of others and the protection of 
social order as legitimate reasons for the limitation of hate speech. The Banjul Charter, in section 
29(4), entrenches the duty of every African to preserve and strengthen national solidarity and this 
is incompatible with freely allowing hate speech. The enactment of PEPUDA and drafting of the 
DHSB clearly indicate the view of the South African legislature as being in favour of limitation. 
Similarly, the South African courts have shown a disposition to limit hate speech when necessary 
in line with the harm principle, as is evident from the High Court‟s finding in Jamiat-Ul-Ulama, 
the CC in Islamic Unity and the BCTSA in Polakow. The recent pronouncement of a hate speech 
positive finding by the Equality Court in the case against Mr. Malema on the song „Shoot the 
Boer‟ affirms that limitation of hate speech has a rightful place in South Africa. 
 
The question whether the limitations placed on hate speech in terms of section 16(2), common 
law remedies and current legislation are sufficient as forms of limitation was answered in the 
negative. Chapter 4 clearly outlined the shortcomings of current common-law remedies that 
could criminalise hate speech indirectly and civil remedies that overlap with PEPUDA. An 
international call for criminalisation was established in chapter 3, and it was noted that South 
Africa as a signatory to ICERD and CEDAW was required to give adherence to the call. Even 
after the promulgation of PEPUDA in 2000 the CC made it clear in 2002 in Islamic Unity that 
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there is a need for further regulation of hate speech. The clear lacuna in South Africa‟s hate 
speech regulation was affirmed and supported by sociological factors such as hate speech re-
offences, the increase in the number of incidents of hate speech and a general social call for 
retribution.  
 
The ultimate question, whether the lacuna in South African hate speech regulation should be 
filled with criminalising legislation was answered in the affirmative. A number of questions were 
answered in order to arrive at this finding. Chapter 3 found that the South African state has a 
duty to punish hate speech perpetrators in addition to its duty to prohibit hate speech. For 
criminalisation to be an option it must be possible to criminalise effectively. The legislature‟s 
attempts to criminalise hate speech have failed dismally so far and this poses the question of 
practicability. An international call for criminalisation highlights weightier considerations such 
as morality, along with public order and safety, as legitimate reasons why certain rights, 
especially freedom of expression, can and should be curbed.
501
 Effective legislative remedies in 
foreign dispensations such as Kenya, Germany and Canada clearly indicate that criminalising 
regulation of hate speech is possible for South Africa.
502
 The analysis in chapter 3 shows that it is 
also possible to distinguish between what is criminal and what is not criminal in the light of the 
cultural connection of each country, as Germany has successfully demonstrated.  
 
Seleoane affirms that there „is a general consensus that freedom of expression, like all other 
rights, is mediated by cultural factors in its application‟.503 South Africa‟s apartheid past is 
undoubtedly a decisive influence in the legislature‟s choice to criminalise negative forms of 
expression. The dangers encapsulated in repeating apartheid-like offences in actions such as 
racially charged hate speech, which incites to imminent violence or harm, outweigh the value of 
a free „market of ideas‟ as far as South Africa is concerned. At the same time there is a risk that 
the government could use hate speech legislation to silence the voice of those who oppose its 
ideologies. Within an analysis of the South African historical reality and its point of development 
as a democracy, the need for legislated rules is clear.
504
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An era of non-criminalisation in South Africa has passed since democratisation and the FXI‟s 
criticism and concern for the exponential escalation of hate speech occurrences is duly noted.
505
  
Braun‟s opinion that social incitement lies at the heart of democratic mobilisation does not 
extend to hate speech in the South African cultural connection and hate speech cannot be left 
unregulated.
506
 The apartheid past calls for protective measures embodying the harm principle to 
shield against counter-democratic hate speech. Criminalising hate speech is offered as the most 
plausible method in South Africa of enhancing and protecting the newly established infant 
democracy which has arisen from the atrocities of its apartheid past. Whether or not effective 
legislation will be promulgated remains something that only the future will tell but the immediate 
need for action remains evident. 
 
5.3   Paving the way for criminalisation of hate speech 
 
The regulation of hate speech through legislative measures has not yet come to pass in South 
Africa. Criticism without offering plausible solutions is of marginal value. The following 
elements have been identified as imperative for ensuring effective hate speech legislation and 
should be incorporated in future attempts to criminalise hate speech. Legislation to criminalise 
hate speech should:  
 be practicable, enforceable and should avoid vagueness 
 be clear in its definition of hate speech within South Africa‟s cultural connection  
 unambiguously define the elements of the hate speech crime (i.e. what is allowed and 
what is prohibited) 
 stipulate defences but at the same time it should not nullify common law defences507 
 incorporate a comprehensible burden of proof 
 be geared toward identifying rights balancing as the core test to be utilised in hate 
speech adjudication, leaving room for further judicial interpretation 
 be inclusive of and clearly stipulate immunity clauses 
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 be clear in the penalties stipulated and these penalties should not be disproportionate to 
the harm caused 
 be internally demarcated to ensure that democracy is protected 
 be drafted in such a way that it is protective in nature 
 
The Camden Principles offer further guidance on the construction of speech-restrictive 
legislation in principle 11.1, which stipulates the following: Legislation should be the subject of 
a social need such as the current social outcry against hate speech in South Africa;
 508
 legislation 
should not be constructed overbroad; the benefit of the legislation to society must outweigh the 
harm it does to freedom of expression; and legislation should be drafted in a manner that is least 
intrusive on freedom of expression in general.
509
 Principle 10.2 clearly stipulates that the 
legislation should acknowledge dissenting opinions and be supportive of different communities 
but at the same time supportive of marginalised groups.
510
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5.3.1 Clear definitions and protective in nature 
 
The first and fundamental problem with attempted hate speech legislation such as the DHSB
 
is 
the lack of a clear definition of what hate and hate speech crimes entail. A practical example will 
aid the analysis:
511
 If a Christian minister preaches against the practice of homosexuality on a 
Sunday morning in church (meeting the criteria for a public place), in accordance with his 
Biblical belief that homosexuality is against the will of God, this could prima facie in the 
absence of a clear hate definition, be interpreted as hate speech.
512
 The principles of fundamental 
justice and rights balancing are inherent checks built into the human rights jurisprudence to avoid 
inequitable occurrences such as the issue of a warrant of arrest for the perpetrating minister.
513
  
Once the minister‟s words are interpreted in context, taking all the background facts and 
circumstances into account, the hate element is removed as the message is theoretically one 
rooted in the love of God, cautioning against sexual perversion.
514
 Webster‟s dictionary defines 
hate as a strong negative emotion coupled with enmity or malice.
515
 An alternative definition is a 
strong distaste coupled with sustained ill will. What becomes clear from the definitions listed 
above is the fact that hate embodies an element of antagonism or hostility which manifests in a 
desire to cause harm. These elements will probably not be present in the sermon and as a result it 
will not meet the definition of a hate speech crime.  
 
Expressions that represent dissenting opinions against identifiable groups communicated without 
a hateful intent cannot be interpreted as hate speech.
516
  Identifiable groups, firstly structured 
around the section 16(2) list of race, ethnicity, gender and religion and then expanded, should be 
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(Date of use 09/09/2011). Minister Ake Green was initially convicted of hate speech in lower court and later 
acquitted by the Swedish Supreme Court on similar facts and circumstances: „They noted the court recognized 
Green‟s comments were made during a religious sermon and did not incite others to take harmful actions against 
homosexuals.‟ 
512
 The example is based on the facts of a Swedish case. Religious Tolerance.org  http://www.religioustolerance. 
org/hom_hat8a.htm (Date of use 27/12/2009). 
513
 The right to freedom of religion, opinion and expression thereof will be weighed against the right to freedom of 
sexual orientation, dignity and equality. 
514
 If hate is not present in the message no criminal action can be found as it then merely becomes the free 
expression of an opinion as guaranteed in the 1996 Constitution. Should this message be coupled with incitement to 
harm homosexual people, the scenario could turn into a hate speech perpetration if the message speaks of malicious 
action.  
515 
McDougal & Littell n 35 409. 
516
 Extension is possible by drawing on the discrimination clause in section 9(3) of the 1996 Constitution.  
114 
 
identified and clearly defined. Defining hate is no easy task and the legislature will have to draw 
on various academic fields such as psychology and sociology in order to arrive at a 
comprehensive definition.  
 
Based on the Camden Principles, „clear definitions‟ implies that the elements of the hate speech 
crime must be outlined and the following South African framework is suggested: The statements 
must be made publicly, with intent and malice, it must be directed towards a defined group and 
inspire violence, severe harm or an imminent breach of peace. According to principle 11.1(iii), 
legislation must be drafted specifically and not broadly as this would encroach on the spirit of 
the right to freedom of expression as the DHSB did.
517
  Acts should be drafted in such a way that 
they are protective in nature towards both the audience who are affected by the hate speech 
message and at the same time towards freedom of expression as a whole in line with principle 
10.2, which supports the value of dissenting opinions.
518
 
 
 
5.3.2 Immunity clauses 
 
Another imperative element for constructing effective hate speech legislation is identifying 
circumstances that disallow prosecution or allow for the legitimate expression of messages that 
prima facie seem to embody hate speech. The Canadian Criminal Code provides a good example 
of such instances of immunity, which include:
519
 Expressions made during private conversations; 
expressions that represent scientific fact; expressions that are made in „good faith‟ as a result of 
religious orientation; expressions made in the public interest; and expressions made with 
governmental approval.
520
 
 
In South Africa the hate speech crime should not extend to bona fide artistic, scientific and 
academic works or to fair and truthful reporting which is in the public interest. In the DHSB the 
legislature was effective in extending immunity for hate speech that is needed and reasonable in 
                                                 
517
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certain circumstances but the inclusion of this immunity clause becomes overbroad in section 
3(1)(d) when it extents hate speech immunity to the „publication of any information, 
advertisement or notice that is in accordance with section 16‟ of the 1996 Constitution.  Clear 
boundaries should be drawn between what are legal and what are illegal forms of hate speech. 
All forms of expression that are in line with those guaranteed under section 16(1) of the 1996 
Constitution are protected under the 1996 Constitution regardless of immunity clauses.  
 
5.3.3 Comprehensible burden of proof 
 
The presumption of innocence is in line with the principles of fundamental justice within 
democratic dispensations. In order to avoid unjust convictions the burden of proof should fall on 
the state in criminalising legislation as the bargaining position of the accused (i.e. financial 
resources, time and cumulative knowledge) is substantially weaker than that of the state. If the 
accused is required to prove his innocence, this reverse onus could place an unjust burden on him 
which in turn could lead to unjust administrative action.
521
 
 
5.3.4 Rights balancing and room for judicial interpretation 
 
The legislature will not be able to clearly define every instance of hate speech as attempted in 
section 2 of the DHSB as this results in overbroad legislation which is weak, ineffective and not 
conducive to its purpose. Rights balancing should be solidified as the central test for hate speech 
crimes along with the text within context and objective reasonable person tests.
522
  Overbroad 
legislation is counter-democratic and attempts to usurp the function of the judiciary while 
contradicting principle 11.1(iv) of the Camden Principles.
523
  A balance must be struck between 
what can be clearly regulated in writing and what must be deduced and interpreted, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, from the facts, circumstances, content and context of the speech.  
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A legislative measure which clearly defines hate speech, clarifies the exceptions to the rule, 
clearly stipulates the burden of proof combined with effective judicial interpretation which 
weighs the rights of the various parties against each other within the democratic process, is the 
only plausible solution to regulating the hate speech phenomenon in South Africa.  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
During the past decade hate speech has been analysed thoroughly by the South African courts, 
tribunals and commissions. The fact is that hate speech instances are on the increase and the 
social outcry for redress and protection against its negative effects is a pressing concern. 
Apartheid represented an era of abuse and denial of freedom of expression in South Africa. 
Uninhibited freedom poses a great threat to dignity and equality, two rights that suffered just as 
much as if not more than freedom of expression under the apartheid era.  
 
The clear gap in hate speech regulation should possibly be filled with criminalising legislation 
but how the drafters go about effecting this limitation will represent either a victory or a disaster 
for freedom of expression and human rights jurisprudence in South Africa in the years to come. 
It seems as if the world has come full circle since the era of enlightenment and Voltaire‟s words 
„I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it,‟ recognising that 
absolute freedom without balance is counterproductive and inherently destructive.
524
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